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The stagnation of internation al trade.betwe en the world wars gave

rise, with a lag, to a reconsidera tion of pre-1914 classical orthodoxy
regarding the role of trade policies on economic developmen t.

Even as

Nurkse, Prebisch and Myrdal wrote, however, the post World War II trade
boom was gathering momentum.

By the 1960s it was clear that such a boom

was not a passing cyclical phenomenon, and, not surprisingl y, a substantial
neoclassica l revival followed in the applied trade and development literature,
although pure trade theory was becoming increasingl y agnostic regarding
free trade.

This paper will survey primarily what has been written since

1960 on the impact of trade policies of less developed countries (LDCs) on
their growth and development .

It will, on the whole, leave aside the literature

on trade policies of developed countries.
What is to be included among "trade policies"?

Pride of place will

be given to· those influencing significant ly the level and composition of
exports of goods and services, although those associated with inducing import
substitutio n beyond the levels dictated by market forces will also be
discussed.

Most LDCs can influence their long.run import level by encouraging

or discouragin g exports, while in practice, they are unlikely to expand
exports just by increasing their imports, a simple point ignored by some
import liberalizat ion attempts of the 1960s.

In other words, although one

can imagine increases in imports triggering mechanisms which will lead to

higher exports, the lags and frictions of that process are likely to be
substantial ly greater than those involved between an export rise and the
following import expansion.

Exchange rate policy, taxes and subsidies on
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merchandise trade, special credit programs, etc., are obvious examples of
trade pol5.cies influencing exports.

There are, however, other policies

which will influence exports, and not just in the trivial sense that in
general equilibrium everything depends on everything else.

It is an

old point, recently reemphasized and quantified (Birnberg and Resnick, 1971)
that infrastructure financed by government can be more or less trade-biased.
Moreover, policies toward multinational corporations (MNCs) have become
for many countries a key element of their export-promotion plans.
Indeed, the classroom distinction between the current and capital
accounts, and the corresponding separation between policies toward trade
and t~ward capital flows is becoming increasingly irrelevant in world
markets dominated by MNCs, even more so than it was already in 1929, when
John H.

Williams chided the classical theory of international trade for

neglecting, in ·spite of Adam Smith's insights, the relation between
international trade and capital migration.

However, space allows us only

superficial incursions into these broader interactions between the current
and capital accounts, and between traditional trade and other developmental
policies.

Subjects like LDC external debt and international reserves

management will be. totally ignored.

Even if the foreign exchange available for imports ·of goods and
services is regarded as given, the mechanisms used to allocate such an
amount among competing uses still have important repercussions on the
development of a country.

Some of the most interesting recent research

in the field of trade and development has dealt precisely with the details
and consequences of different policies for repressing and controlling
imports of goods and services.

Discussion of import repressing policies, like tariffs and quotas,
tend to give them an exaggerated autonomous or trigger role, from which
certain resource allocation decisions are supposed to follow.

Yet in

most contemporary developing countries those policies are only one weapon

in the planning arsenal of the state, and frequently only an accommodating
instrument, which follows decisions taken elsewhere.

For example, a

public investment bank may decide, as part of an industrialization program,
to set up a petrochemical plant with or without private sector help; once
that decision is approved, tariffs or quotas will be adjusted and changed
as frequently as it is necessary so that the new plant can sell all of its
output domestically.

Tax rebates, low interest loans, etc., will also

help the new plant.

Thus, research on LDC trade policies should ideally

be carried out in the context of their domestic development policies
(Bhagwati and Krueger, 1972).
Trade policy instruments are far easier to describe than the target
of economic development.

By now everyone knows that for most LDCs growth

of per capita GNP is only one of the several development targets.

A more

equal income distribution among families and regions and a greater degree
of national autonomy are, inter alia, other developmental targets, which
sometimes conflict with one another, even when they do not include lofty
desires to create a "New Man." Glib references·to different targets are
frequently used to justify all kinds of trade policies. which are most
unlikely to serve the efficient pursu~t of any goal.

Nevertheless. real

trade-offs do remain.
LDCs differ not only in the weight they, or their ruling groups. give
to different development targets, but also, of course, in their size,
resource endowment, per capita income. etc.

This reminder of the limitations

of purely qualitative arguments is sometimes lost in the fury of the ancient
debate between protectionists and free traders.

And these typological

considerations can be more important for trade policie~ than differences
in developmental targets.

Many aspects of the trade experience of Taiwan,

for exa~ple, may be more relevant to Cuha than those of the U.S.S.R., while
India is unlikely to find much inspiration in the Hong Kong model.
The traditional central question in the field of trade and development,
as put by Meier (1968), is:
gains from growth?

Are the gains from trade in conflict with the

Or more simply, is international trade good or bad for

growth and development?

Kindleberger's (1962, p. 211) answer indicated

that the question should be rephrased.

The relevant queries seem to be

the following:
1.

Under what conditions will free trade (or more trade) increase

per capita growth?
2.

Under what conditions will free trade· (or more trade) bring LDCs

closer to their other development targets?
3.

Can the LDCs, by their own actions, influence how much they trade?

4.

Can the above qualitative effects be quantified even roughly,

and what does such quantification te 11 us about the importance of
trade policies (for good and evil) in achieving th~ different
development targets?
The rest of the paper will be organized as follows:

First, recent

theoretical work will be reviewed. to see what answers it suggests to
the above questions and what guidance it gives to empirical studies.

Next,

research on economic history, and on long term and cross section patterns

will be surveyed.

It will be seen that theoretical studies cast (an

uncertain) light primarily on the first question, while providing some
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tools which can he used, although they seldom are, to analyze the second.
Research on pre-World War II economic history, and cross section studies
yield scattered and contradictory hints for answering the first three
questions.

TI1e paper will then examine empirical work on the issue of

whether and by how much the LDCs can affect the level and compositiori of
their exports, focusing on the rout of export pessimism during the 1960s.
Recent work on some perennial issues surrounding the export sector will
be discussed next.

Attention will turn afterwards to work discussing

mechanisms for suppressing import demand.

Finally, quantification attempts

which have been or need to be done on the several links between trade and
development, in the world as it exists circa 1973, will be discussed.

Some

cranky conclusions, in the spirit of self-criticism, close the paper.
Guidance from Theoretical Developments
In the trade and development literature there has existed for a long
time, at least going back to John S. Mill, a striking difference between
the rigor of formal proofs on the static advantages of free trade, typically
involving careful assumptions and caveats, and the impetuous enthusiasm
with which most of the professional mainstream advocates free or freer
trade policies, on both static and dynamic grounds, for all times and places.
Positive theories of trade and of balance of ~ayments adjustment mechanisms
. have come and gone, but whether one subscribes to "vent for surplus,"

Ricardian, Heckscher-Ohlin, or product cycle theories of trade, or to
monetarist, absorption, or elasticities approaches to balance of payments
adjustment, the typical normative advice on trade policy comes out pretty
much the same.

The leap from the sensible proposition that some trade can

potentially make everyone better off as compared with no trade, to the
conviction that more trade is always likely to do just that, is taken with
remarkable ease.
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The mainstream has tended to minimize what Mill called "the temporary
inconvenience of the change" toward freer trade.

It is ironic that one of

the few recent efforts to conceptualize and quantify the burden of adjusting
to freer trade policies has been done for one of the richest countries in
the world, the U.S.A. (Baldwin and Mutti, 1972).
Even leaving aside adjustment costs, the tension between guarded
theoretical results and the ultra-pro-trade-biased obiter-dicta of the
professional mainstream has sharply increased during the 1950s and 1960s,
as a result of general theoretical developments and what may be called the
Indian planner's revenge.

Once the Pandora's box of distortions and the

second~best had been opened by professionally respectable hands (Haberler,
1950; Little, 1950; Lipsey and Lancaster 5 1956-67), intellectual curiosity
plus the fact that modern analytical tools were falling more and more
into the hands of economists whose background made them skeptical of trad
itional free trade verities and who rightfully resented the glib conventional
wisdom of bureaucrats in aid-granting organizations, generated consis~ent
theoretical models embodying more or less realistic distortions, and in which
free trade need not always be the best policy available.
It is true that in those static models (for exampl~, Johnson, 1965a;
Bhagwati, 1971) taxes or subsidies on international trade are not the optimal pol

icies except in the old-fashioned case of monopoly power in international markets,
if there are other policy instruments at hand which can tackle distortions dir

ectly.

But it is easy to see that different assumptions regarding availabil-

ity, effectiveness as well as real costs of different policy instruments can
yield a disconcerting variety of heterodox conclusions.

By now any bright

graduate student, by choosing his assumptions regarding disto1"1:ion$ and
policy instruments carefully, can produce a consistent model yielding
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just about any policy recommendat ion he favored at the start.

Note that

to reach this conclusion one needs not to introduce other developmen tal
targets besides static efficiency.

The conclusion, of course, applies

a fortiori when other targ~ts are brought in.

Algebra and consistent models cari prove nothing about the real

world, but perhaps the major contributio n of these models, and of those
sure to follow them, is to force the discussion of the realism of different
assumptions which are crucial for determining under what conditions more
trade benefits whom, and by how much.

Given our professiona l discipline

and prejudices, this result could not have been accomplishe d only by
outside critics, who did not frame their doubts and skepticism in
accepted mainstream theoretical language.
Postwar theoretical development s (Meade, 1955; Johnson, 1960) have
also provided neoclassica l frameworks for quantifying costs and benefits
Typically, the strict

of trade policies for small or large countries.

application of that methodology to actual situations yields the result
that contemplate d changes in trade policy will raise or lower the nation's

GNP by at most a few percentage points (see, for example, Harberger, 1959).
Introducing effective rates of protection into calculation s, making alternative
assumptions as to whether protected industries will dis~p~ear under free
trade (Balassa, 1966), computing the present discounted value of a 11 future
benefits of liberalizati on (Magee, 1972), etc., can raise somewhat those
results, but not by much.

It is possible to get the standard model to

generate hypothetica l situations in which the costs of protection and self
sufficiency loom large, partly by assuming low elasticitie s of substitutio n
in consumption and production (Johnson, 1965b).

1

But in countries where

those ela-sticitie s are indeed very low, one may wonder whether it may not
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be better to work with structura list or two-gap models, which after all
are designed to emphasize inflexibl e economic structure s.

In short, the

theoretic al model used to show the qualitati ve superiori ty of free trade,
can also show, if accompani ed by assumptio ns most congenial to the neoclassi cal
paradigm, i.e., high substitut ion elasticit ies, that the benefits are
quantitat ively small.
At this point, many authors quickly add that static effects are only
one, and probably the least important , of the positive effects of free
trade, This is likely to be right, but it implies that the standard neo
classical theoretic al framework has some serious flaws, and fails to
capture key aspects of the real world (Leibenst ein, 1966).

Faced with

the alternati ve of strict adherence to the pure model yielding small
quantitat ive effects

or adding to it epicycles so that free trade looks

quantitat ively better, most authors have chosen the latter.

This situation

has a number of similarit ies with that in growth accountin g and in the
explanati on of cross-cou ntry productiv ity differenc es, where Nelson has
shown the weaknesse s

of the pure neoclassi cal methodolo gy {particul arly

in 1972 and 1973). In all cases the pureneoc lassical model is a poor
guide to ~ntrepren eurial behavior, particula rly regarding productiv ity
control and the search for and diffusion of innovatio ns, which are more
likely to explain both growth and productiv itv•differ ences better than
variation s in such things as capital-l abor ratios and static allocatio n.
With few exception s {Brainard and Cooper, 1968), uncertain ty and costs of
informati on have also been left out of neoclassi cal trade models.
While competiti on from world markets can, under the right condition s,
insure that no major departure s from static efficienc y will survive in an
industry, it will not necessar ily promote autonomou s innovatio n and adaptatio n.
On the other hand, protected entrepren eurs can turn lazy and complacen t,
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or could use that market safety to devote their energies toward innovation
and exports depending on their "animal spirits."

Compare, for example,

the textile industries in Brazil and Colombia, both of which have been
overprotected for a long time.

The former turned X-inefficient (Bergsman,

1970, Chapter 8), while the latter has been known for its progressiveness
even before it began exporting in substantial amounts.

Or compare quota

protected Japanese corporations and entrepreneurs with most British ones
who are exposed to greater import competition, and who are at best
protected with tariffs.
International trade in knowledge and technological services, a topic
of particular interest for developing countries whether those services are
embodied in direct investment or are hired directly, cannot be handled
adequately within neoclassical models with assumptions of identical
production fun~tions and free trade conclusions, even if one is willing
to neglect Schumpeterian considerations.

As put by Johnson (1970a):

" •.. the essential problem is that reliance on the market principle of
rewarding investment in the discovery of knowledge, which has the nature
of a public good, by granting a temporary monopoly of the use of the
knowledge .... is inherently inefficient" (p. 20).

(See also Katz, 1972,

Chapter 2.)
Structural models of trade and development (Chenery and Bruno, 1962;
McKinnon, 1964; Chenery and Strout, 1966), formalizing insights developed

also within the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America during
the 1950s (see, for example, United Nations, 1959), since their birth
tended to sacrifice theoretical rigor for the sake of empirical applicability.

This fact, particularly regarding the ex-ante, ex-post confusion. plus
their assumptions of low elasticities of substitution in consumption and
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production, and of exogenously given growth rates for exports, generated
c~nsiderabl ~ criticism during the increasingl y elasticity- optimistic 1960s,
when the structural models came to be regarded as the intellectua l under
pinning for import substitutio n strategies (Fei and Ranis, 1968; Bruton, 1969).
Nevertheles s, the simplificat ions involved in structural models still exert
considerabl e intellectua l and practical appeal.

An example of the former

can be seen in Findlay's (1971) theoretical tidying up of the two-gap model,
while fresh empirical application s of revised and extended two-gap models
continue to be produced (Weisskopf) 1972a; Chenery and Carter, 1972).
A promising development

ii the introductio n of some non-zero

substitutio n possibiliti es in planning modela which had generated two-gap
scenarios, and the quantificat ion of the impact of such a change in assumptions .
This route seems to lead to a convergence of neoclassica l and structurali st
models; compare, for example, the Johnson (1965b and 1966) simulations ~ith
the Chenery and Raduchel

(1971) arguments and calculation s.

Neither, of

course, can quantify X-efficienc y effects, induced technical change and costs
of obtaining information .

The latter authors, while admitting that policy

variables such as the exchange rate can help to fully utilize domestic
resources, remain doubtful that indirect factor substitutio n via demand and
trade can be extensive enough to accommodate very wide variations in factor
proportions .

Their last sentence is worthy of full quotation:

"This

formulation offers the hope for shifting policy discussions from the
ideological level to empirical questions of estimating structural relations
and determining policy choices from them.

In that context. there need be

no inconsisten cy between the structurali st diagnoses of the causes of
underdevelo pment and the use of neoclassica l guidelines for planners" (p. 47).
Two-gappers and neoclassici sts agree that the shadow price of foreign
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exchange in LDCs is generally greater than its official value and that
the t~o-gap problem is typically a symptom of inefficient allocation
policies (Chenery, 1971. p. 92).
The suggested convergence is like 1v to be aided t-v fresh work on
models in the neoclassical spirit which directly emhody possihle effects
of trade on growth, and which subdivide output not onlv into importal-,les
and exportables. but also into consumption and investment.

While the effects

of growth on trade have been exhaustively analyzed using the Heckscher
Ohlin-Samuelson framework. much less has been done on the trade-on-growth
link.

Corden (1971) has explored the growth effects of trade which

" ••• are not necessarily the most important ones in practi~e rut are those
that emerge most clearly from a simple neoclassical model" (p. 117).

His

emphasis on the impact of trade policies on the relative price and/or
availahility of.investment goods is, however. likelv to be of verv great
practical relevance, and offers an important link to the structural models.
Bardhan's (1970) and Findlay's (1972) dynamization of several aspects
of trade theory. and their rigorous analysis of trade and development
problems, are also important steps toward incorporating developmental
insights into more or less formal trade and development models. although
it is not always clear how those models could be quantified and used for

policy purposes.

The extension of the distortion literature into more dynamic

contexts should also yield interesting results. as already indicated by
the work of Johnson (1967 and 1970b) and Bhagwati (1968~).

More could also

be done to bring the link between income distribution. consumption patterns
and savings into such models.

2
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Theoretical work is likely. alas. to continue generating interesting
parameters and relationships at a much faster rate than such things are
quantified.

But a bringing together of theoretical developments on

distortions and policy instruments, on the one hand. and on dualistic
mode ls. on the other. where the "modern" sector is sp li_t up into import
competing and exporting parts. may yield scenarios useful to guide
empirical research on historical and contemporary cases where more trade
yielded poor or ambiguous developmental results.

Hopefully, those models

would be more in accordance with the known stylized facts

3

about LDCs

than most of the present pure trade or pure development models are.

It

would be a matter of pinpointing and selecting the key circumstances under
which the unavoidable (and the avoidable) rigidities. imperfections and
distortions in LDC markets set the stage for a failure to capture the
potential gains from trade for developmental purposes.
Many of the possible building blocks are at hand; besides the standard
staple

or vent-for-surplus (Caves. 1965; Findlay, 1970, Chapter 4) and

dualistic models (Ranis and Fei, 1961), one can mention Brecher's (1972)

work on the role of minimum wages in trade theory, showing the possibilitv
that larger·exports lead to greater unemployment.

Also worth noting are

the Hymer and Resnick (1969) model of agrarian economies with non-argricultural
activities. and the Birnberg and Cohen (1971) second-best analysis in the
context of distorted development conditions.

The beautiful Lewis - (W. A. Lewis 1~6S·)

model explaining trends in terms of trade for tropical exports. as well as
relative standards of living, on the basis of average labor productivity in
food production in tropical and temperate countries. lends itself to a
num~er of extensions, and also to different interpretations, some of which
are of a nee-Marxist radical character (Emmanuel. 1972. pp. 87-90).

Besides
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Emmanuel. nee-Marxist contrirutions to pure trade theorv. in contrast
with those in economic history and theory of capital movements are scanty.
The further exploration of differences in production functions
between DCs and LDCs, which may varv from sector to sector. could also
yield some relevant insights. combined with- research along the product
cycle line pioneered by

Vernon (summarized in 1971). The works of Linder

.(1961) and Nelson (1968) also contain a number of ideas and hypotheses
waiting to be further expanded.

The old complaint that comparative

advantage models were insufficiently "dynamic" is on the way of being met,
probably with a vengeance.

As in the case of recent explorations of the

infant industry argument for protection, more empirical studies could
greatly enrich theoretical analysis.
;

This kind of work can re extended to the analysis of the impact
of direct fore~gn investment on LDC economies.

4

See for example the paper

by Cohen (1972b), in which cases are generated in the context of development~
dualistic models, where the impact of incoming foreign investment on the
host economy can be negative.

The concept of an optimal tax or subsidy on

international capital movements, developed by Kemp (1966) and Jones (1967),
should also be of interest to empirical researchers and economic historians,
and particularly to tpose with a radical bent.
Another line of theoretical endeavor in which fruitful interactions

with empirical research will continue to occur is the analysis of illegal foreign
trade transactions, such as smuggling and fake invoicing (Bhagwati and Hansen~

1973a).

An interesting political economy sidelight in this field would explore

asymmetries in what different countries regard as legal transactions, or
at least transactions not vigorously persecuted.

The importation of

some commodities (e.g., marijuana) is actively repressed in most rich

·countries, which complain that many LDCs tolerate such exports from their
territories.

On

the other hand, most LDCs ban the export of archeological

items deemed part of their heritage, while the same items have entered
into rich countries either legally, according to their own laws, or
using illegal routes not zealously guarded by authorities preferring not
to upset wealthy collectors.
The application to international trade and development of theories
involving externalities and the misuse of valuable but unclaimed assets
is also likely to grow, as a result of LDC interest in pollution (parti
cularly the desire of some LDCs to develop comparative advantage in
pollution-intensive activities)s as well as in the sharing of mankind's
"comments," such as oceans and space, explaining some preemptive enclosure
movements (the 200 miles issue).
This review of theoretical developments has, following custom, dealt
with real or long run trade theory.

As

will be seen below, much recent

empirical work on LDC trade problems has called attention to their short
run adjustment mechanisms.

Development theorists have tended to ignore

the cyclical-macroeconomic problems of LDCs, which are typically closely

tied to balance of payments management, while theorists of adj:ustment
mechanisms for rich countries have paid little attention to the case of
LDCs.

As a result, theoretical analysis of LDC-short term policies for

simultaneously achieving internal and external balance, as well as
income distribution and growth targets, has been neglected.

A notable

exception is the recent paper of Taylor (lq73), which correctly emphasizes
the particularly difficult dilemmas faced by policy makers in many semi
industrialized economies.
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Reexaminati on of the Pre-World War II Economic History of Trade Policies
and Development
The nineteenth cenl:ur'yrole of freer trade in weakening the position
of unprogressi ve British landlords, the real targets of Ricardo, plus

the fact that it accompanied the settlement and/or prosperity of some
predominant ly Anglo-Saxon or Scandinavia n developing countries, has had a
disproporti onate influence in tilting the mainstream literature, dominated
by Anglo-S3xon and Scandinavia n authors, toward a benign and optimistic
view of the trade and growth nexus.

The combined population of· Australia.

Canada, New Zealand, Denmark and Sweden around 1900 was 18 million, a figure
roughly equal to that for the combined population of Taiwan and Hong Kong
today.

If to those five successful countries one adds Argentina, South

Africa, and Uruguay, their total 1900 population reaches 31 million, or

less than two per cent of the world population at that time, and about the
demographic size of today's South Korea.
The Nurksian notion of trade as the historical engine of growth has
recently been challenged even for some "countries of recent settlement. "
Kravis (1972)· rejects the view that causal predominanc e can be assigned

to external demand factors in accounting for nineteenth century U.S. economic
growth; he also argues (Kravis, 1970) that internation al trade policies
and performance s cannot provide a differentia l diagnosis to explain varying

growth records of countries in the nineteenth century.

Trade, at best,

was a handmaiden of a growth whose mainsprings were internal, and it may
be added, difficult to locate exactly. In a Kindleberge rian spirit, Kravis

also suggests that both trade and investment can be fickle and opportunist ic
handmaidens ; they mav serve growth, but could also serve structures
perpetuatin g underdevelo pment.

-16For the Canadian case, Chambers and Gordon (1966) applied a strict
neoclassical model to quantify the share of the increase in per capita
income during 1901-11 which could be attributed to the wheat export boom.
·Not surprisingly, given the methodology, that share came out small, about
6 per cent.

Although Caves (1971a) accepts t-heir conclusion that advances

in international technological knowledge and its application are

likely

to comprise the main source of income gains for small nations, a conclusion
whose policy implications are unclear, he adjusts the Chambers and Gordon's
calculations in mildly heterodox ways, raising that share to 21 per cent.
In the same article, Caves has also provided a thorough survey (with
extensive bibliography) and stimulating discussion of possible uses of the
export-led growth model as a research tool, concluding that it is best
applied to national or regional time series, but difficult to handle in
cross-country ~tudies.

The important difference

between extensive and

per capita growth also receives attention from Caves, and Chambers and
Gordon.
Skepticism regarding the historical predominance of beneficial links
between trade and development has always increased when attention shifted
to those countries which even today remain underdeveloped.

In many of

those countries, freer trade policies were adopted durin~ the nineteenth
century and up to 1930 not always simply as a result of the persuasive
powers of Mill and Ricardo, but mainly as a consequence of unequal treaties
imposed forcefully by colonial and neocolonial powers (see, for example,
Hansen and Nashashibi, 1972, Chapter 1).

Little wonder, then, that free

trade policies which had to be buttressed by foreign gunhoats failed to
be universally viewed by LDCs as obvious handmaidens of their development.
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Caves (1971a)discusses some of the reasons usually given for failures
of rising exports to induce significant and self-sustained growth in developing
countries, listing (pp. 433-37) ten possible and more or less positive linkages
between staple export expansion and intensive growth.

He tentatively adds an

interesting eleventh effect, which contrary to the typical presumption in t~e
literature on LDC export instability, suggests in a Schumpeter-Hirschman spirit
that irregular (supply induced) bursts of staple exports will " ••• spur a larger
quantity of capital formation and more diverse type of projects, than a growth
process not attended by windfalls ••• " (p. 437).

Leff (1972a and 1972b) blames

economic retardation in nineteenth century Brazil on too few rather than too
many exports; lack of internal capacity to transform and reallocate resources

led to Brazilian failures to adapt and profit fully from shifts in a comparative
advantage.

He also introduces into the historical discussion the notion of

optimum currency areas, suggesting that populations in large LOCs would have
been better off had they been distributed among several smaller nation-states,
rather than one large country with poor internal factor mobility.
Lewis (1969, Lecture 1) indicates that pessimism regarding the historical

trade an0 development link is largely an optical illusion.

Trade, he argues,

was indeed an engine of growth for most of the tropics having ''a stab le and

modern type of government," at least during 1880 to 1913.

The illusion arises:

from failure to realize that, given large subsistence sectors, trade was a
smaller proportion of tropical economies than manufacturing was of temperate
economies; from neglect of the fact that the starting point for LDCs was very
low, due mainly to poor agricultural productivity; from too much emphasis on the

"special" cases of land-poor India and the sugar islands; and from not putting
the dismal interwar period in proper historical perspective.

It should

be noted that Lewis is not so much trying to give new life to the
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thesis of trade as an engine of growth, as to comhat views arguing that
tropical growth would not be possible until deep spiritual and social
transformations had occurred in those countries.
Other authors, contrary to Lewis, have emphasized the disruptive effects
of expanding trade on underdeveloped economies, as well as the weaknesses

or negative nature of backward linkages, uneven distribution of gains from
trade, etc.

Several have noted that, contrary to British experience, freer

trade strengthened the economic and political position of landlords and
regressive elements in LDC societies.
The upsurge of radical economics during the 1960s gave fresh impetus

to such historical views and research.

See for example the work of Resnick

(1970) on the decline of rural industry under export expansion in Southeast

Asia, the Hymer and Resnick (1971) paper on international trade and uneven
development, arid that of G. Frank (1970) on Latin America.

These and other

authors, not all "radical," stress that asymmetries in political and military
power will be reflected not only in asymmetries in the distribution of the
burden of adjusting to equilibrium disturbances, but also in the det·ermination
of equilibrium itself.

The more extreme thesis is that markets grow out

of the barrel of a gun, so the powerful can play the market following the
rule of '·'heads I win, tails you lose."

Although this extreme version

appears to be an exaggeration, it is clearly incorrect to assume that
markets exist independent of socio-political and power realities, as shown
by the experience of markets under colonialism.

The colonial experience with

markets, in turn, varied according to the policies of hegemonic powers
(Birnberg and Resnick, 1971).

See also the discussion by Triffin (1968) of

the actual workings of the gold standard during the nineteenth century,
showing how Britain thrust the major burden of adjusting to her cyclical
balance of payments difficulties onto the countries of the periphery.

Drawing heavily on pre-World War II historical experience, Sunkel
(1969) and Furtado (1971)

have elaborated building blocks of the Latin

American "dependence" school, which examines not only the purely economic
links r.etween trade and growth, including the inducement to technological
change, but also reemphasizes negative long run effec__t s of export-led
I
growth on the autonomous development of LDC social and political institutions.

Contrary to Mill, who celebrated the impact on LDC tastes of the introduction
of new products, these authors point to negative economic and social
repercussions of international demonstration effects in consumption.

Other

authors have also lamented the spread of "consumerism" implicit in outward
looking trade policies, suspecting undesirable shifts in indigenous tastes.
Girvan (1972) has noted the independent but related development of similar
ideas in the sugar ex~colo~ies or plantation economies of the Caribbean.

The dependence school, although providing numerous inter-disciplin ary insigh~s,
still contains several ambiguities (Pinto, 1972).

It remains unclear,

for example, whether dependence has more to do with economic size than with
social system, and whether only LDCs are dependent.

Indeed, a fully

satisfactory definition of "dependence" is hard to find, and the policy
prescriptions flowing from this school are vague.
G. Frank (1970) has emphasized the healthy response·of several
Latin.American economies to the great depression of the 1930s, as well as
to the two world wars, suggesting that, contrary to orthodoxy, LDCs do best

when the rich are weakest.

But he seems to have interpreted a situation

in which the more advanced IDCs were doing the best of a bad thing, in the
trade field, as one absolutely preferable, from che LDC viewpoint, to world

wide prosperity.

Frank's thesis is stronger in the area of direct foreign

investment; for example, several LDCs took advantage of conditions during

-20the Secqnd World War to buy back rather cheaply European assets within
their territories.

Further comparative work on various LDC reactions to

the Depression and the world wars should provide insights comparable to
those of Kindleberger (1951) regarding group behavior and international
trade.

Frank also has given historical examples of regions geographically

remote and isolated from metropolitan centers, claiming that they initiated
and experienced the most promising self-generating economic development in
Latin America, before they were stopped by lower transport costs and freer
trade.
It should be clear by now that historical research yields no less
ambiguous results than those surveyed under theory.

The problem is not

only the different ideologies and nationalities of the authors, but also
the different weights placed by them on the various dimensions of development,
and their non-testable views on "what it could have been," had the countries
remai~ed isolated from international trade currents.

In history, as in

cross-section research to be reviewed below, our small and young planet does
not seem to provide enough variance and sufficient degrees of freedom to
test our theories unambiguously.

It has been the practice of many economists, when faced with
historical or contemporary situations in.which it appears, prima facie,
that growing trade led to weak or negative developmental results, to blame
lack of LDC "preconditions," or market imperfections and distortions, or
weak "societal responses" to development opportunities, etc., without usually

bothering to further define and analyze these factors and explanations,

which verge on the tautological.

1\10

avenues seem worth exploring to cast

further light on the absolute or relative historical failures in the trade
and development literature.
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One, already mentioned, would be to set up realistic models useful
. to isolate market frictions and distortions which account for unsatisfactory
U>C reactions to trade stimuli, and to contrast thoae imperfections with
the policy tools which LDC government had at hand before 1930.

It is

often forgotten that, whether independent or not, most of those governments
had little control over their exchange rates, due to their commitment to
the gold standard, and that most did not even have a central bank, while
their fiscal machinery was rudimentary.

Little wonder, then, that in LDCs

characterized by large subsistence sectors and imperfect markets, the
abandonment of one of the few policy tools those governments had, e.g.,
tariff rates, bad often to be imposed by foreign pressure.
A second, and more difficult, step would be to look at social and
political institutions which lie behind market distortions and imperfections,
and which could also explain the degree and speed of the spread of educative
effects arising from a more open economy (Myint, 1969).

Why did LDC

governments, for example, mow greater interest in breaking some infrastructure
bottlenecks rather than others?

Who gained, if anybody, and who lost from

such imperfections and institutional arrangements?
a result of policies?

Were those imperfections

If not, could they have been resolved by policy?

The Post World War II LDC Experience with Trade Policies and Developrr.ent;
·Empirical Research on the Overall Performance.
Three major styles can be noted in scholarly empirical work looking
at overall LDC postwar performance on trade and development:

the econometric

analysis of cross-section and time series data for many countries; more
specific country or sector studies; and grand summaries.

On

the whole,

these three styles look at the aggregate picture, and skip exhaustive
discussion of the details in the trade and development nexus.

-22Inspired by the monumental work of Kuznets (see, for example, 1966
and 1967), the econometric analysis of LDC cross-section and time series
data starts with the hypothesis that there are uniform patterns of change

in the structure of production as income levels rise, subject to secular

shifts due to innovational changes.

The paper by Chenery and Taylor (1968)

may be taken as the best published example of this school.

Three I.DC

development patterns are isolated; for large countries (more than 15 to 25
million inhabitants), small industry-oriented countries, and small
primary-oriented countries.

From the viewpoint of this survey, the most

striking result of Chenery-Taylor is that so much can be explained without
reference to variations in trade policies, once differences in size and
resource endowments are taken into account.

5

While many LDCs have followed

roughly similar trade policies, there has been a fair degree of variance
among them (Me~ico vs. Brazil, Philippines vs. Egypt, etc.), so the
Chenery-Taylor results cannot be explained by saying that no policy effect
is detected because all LDC policies were the same.

Size and resources

in this article seem to be destiny, and all that policy appears to do is
to somewhat speed or delay a given LDC along its preordained development
path, but cannot change the pattern.

This will not bother those most

interested in the link between trade policies and per capita growth, but

will dtsturb those hoping to use trade policies to significantly alter
the productive structures associated with a given per capita income.

Trying

to give a small primary oriented country the industrial structure of a

diversified large country will simply stop or slow down growth.

But it is

also implied that India and Brazil, liberalize as they may, will maintain
a diversified and "heavy" industrial structure.

6
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The quantification of the more short-term structural models generated
by the Chenery planning school has focused on the identification of major
· development bottlenecks, usually either savings or foreign exchange, for
a given country, and on the measurement of the impact of foreign resource
inflows on growth, and more recently, on domestic savings.

These efforts

have yielded the measurement for many countries of important functions,
such as those for imports and savings, as well as for the link between
investment and output.

An interesting summary of the latest refinements

for these functions may be found in Chenery and Carter (1972).

Unfortunately,

export functions continue to be a weak spot in these constructions, which
typically make exports depend simply on time.
Weisskopf (1972a) has proposed and applied an econometric test for
whether the growth of a given LDC is constrained by lack of savings or
foreign exchange.

He concludes that a binding trade constraint, contrary

to the usual belief, has been a relatively infrequent phenomenon in LDC
postwar experience.

Some of his results are puzzling; for example, Peru

comes out dominated by a trade constraint while Colombia appears bound by
a savings constraint.

His ex-ante savings function makes exports one of

the independent variables, on the ground that for many countries a strong
ex-post link has been observed between exports and savings.
~

There are also

priori reasons to expect some connection between exports and savings;

for example, public savings often rely heavily on trade taxes.

This

formulation is now common in Chenery-style models; see Landau (1971),
and for an earlier formulation, Vanek (1967).

Such specification appears

to further blur the distinction between the savings and foreign exchange
constraints.

It could be argued that a close link between fluctuating

savings and exports is observed simply because the latter allow the importation

-24of machin ery, unavai lable otherw ise, which nation al accoun ts registe
r
as investm ent, and therefo re, given accoun ting proced ures, as residu
al
domest ic saving s.
The Chener y-style savings functio n has also genera ted contro versy in
the related area of the impact of capita l inflow s, or just aid, on domest
ic
saving s.

Weissk opf (1972b) and others have argued that the eviden ce

indica tes a strong negativ e correla tion between savings and foreign
aid.
Papane k (1972 and 1973) has provide d a convin cing critiqu e of the method
ology
used in reachin g those results .

The key problem is the peculi ar defini tion

which makes domest ic savings a functio n, inter alia, of domest ic output
,
and not on a measure of disposa ble income, which for a country as a
whole
would include the grant elemen t of capita l inflow s.

Papanek notes that

given the mislead ing definit ion of domest ic savings as equal to investm
ent
minus all fore~gn resourc e inflow s, any increas e in investm ent which
is
smalle r than the increas e in foreign inflows will by defini tion le~d
to an
absolu te drop in recorde d domest ic saving s.

A pure grant from abroad , for

exampl e, used fully for relief, i.e., consum ption, which leaves domest
ic
:invest ment unchan ged, will lead by the illogic of this accoun ting to
a recorde d
drop in domest ic saving s.

Papanek urges separa te treatme nt of differe nt

capita l inflows , and also observe s that many other reali~ tic consid
eration s
indica te that factors which produce below average saving s rates will
produc e
above average foreign inflow s.

On the whole, these and other econom etric

exerci ses are on more solid ground when workin g direct ly with investm
ent data
than with those ill-def ined residu als now labelle d domest ic saving s.
During the 1960s there has been a volumin ous outpou ring of countr y
and sector studies for LDCs, which typica lly devote substa ntial section
s to
discus sing trade policie s and develop ment.

In many cases, pre-Wo rld War II trends
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are discussed at least as backgroun d to postwar developm ents.

While

these studies emphasize the experienc e and institutio ns of particula r
countries , they generally rely, implicitl y or explicitl y, tightly or
loosely, on one or several of the standard trade and developme nt models.
The Yale Economic Growth Center, for example,h as sponsored a series of
ambitious country studies having both a historica l and trade orientati on.
No grand summing up of these country studies has yet appeared, and if
any such ever comes along, it would have to emphasize the variety of trade
and developm ental experienc es found in those volumes.
Criticism of LDC trade policies hampering export expansion , of
delayed and sporadic devaluati ons under inflation ary condition s, and of
erratic and excessive protection ism are themes which appear in some of the
Yale country studies, particula rly in that for Argentina .

This theme is

also develope9 in the Nelson, Schultz and Slighton (1971) volume on Colombia;

and in that of S. Lewis (1969) for labor-ric h Pakistan.

Other country

studies have been written around open dualistic land-surp hus mode-ls.
Examples include the work of Helleiner (1966) on Nigeria, and that of Hicks
and McNicoll (1971) on the Philippin es.

The latter authors not only warn

against excessive import substitut ion, but also against continued reliance
on resource- intensive export growth.

Interesti ng examples of sectoral studies emphasizi ng the trade and
developme nt nexus include Roemer (1970), C.
Reynolds, 1965) and Leff (1968).

Reynolds (in Mamalakis and

The major contribut ion of the first book

lies in its analytica l descripti on of the Peruvian fishmeal industry,
blending applied theory, straightfo rward economet rics and interestin g
narrative .

That book's weakness is typical of many recent works on trade

and developm ent; together with scientifi c analysis of a specific case the

author gives us an evangelical description of the benefits of the export-led
development ~n general.

The capricious anchovies, alas, have decided to

jolt this particular success story by mysteriously disappearing from
Peruvian coasts throughout 1972.

Reynold's study of how the then foreign

owned copper sector interacted with the Chiiean economy developed the concept
of "returned value," i.e., that part of copper sales abroad paid locally
in the form of wages, taxes, purchase of materials, etc., a more significant
magnitude than the gross exports of those enterprises.

This concept,

incidentally, could be fruitfully applied to some new LDC manufacturing
export activities, dominated by MNCs and which rely heavily on foreign
inputs.
While Roemer and Reynolds expanded the established export economy
research line, Leff's study of the Brazilian capital goods industry analyzes
in depth the h~storical evolution of import substituting activities, a relatively
new and much needed re.search endeavor.

The growth of that Brazilian industry,

he found, was achieved without import restrictions, thanks partly to an
elastic domestic supply for the required inputs, including technical and
skilled personnel.

He is also skeptical of the thesis that the development

of domestic capital goods industry by itself will lead to accelerated rates
of capital formation, at least for big Brazil.

A related study, that of

Baer (1969), also provides a favorable analysis of the expansion of the
Brazilian steel industry.
As a result of the outpouring of country and sectoral studies, as

well as of more specialized articles, on which more below, survey articles
and books began to appear in the middle 1960s, attempting to evaluate overall
LDC development and trade strategies.

Import substituting industrializati on

received early and mostly critical attention, as in the paper by Macario (1964).
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can struct uralis ts
Critic ism came from both neocl assici sts and some Latin Ameri
econom ic
who argued that import substi tution would inevit ably lead to
stagna tion unless income s were drasti cally redist ribute d.

The Willia ms

s, such as
group also provid ed, beside s origin al resear ch, valuab le survey
those of Bruton (1970) and Sheaha n (1972) .

The weakn esses of the "impo rt

and fairly
subst itutio n syndro me" are by now being repeat ed ad nauseu m,
man (1968) and
sympa thetic review s of that strate gy, such as those by Hirsch
st critic s.
Baer (1972) , are grossl y outnum bered by orthod ox and struc turali

The critiq ue of LDC polici es used to induce import subst itutin g
Little ,
indus trializ ation reache d a climax with the public ation of the
herea fter as
Scitov sky and Scott compa rative volume (1970) , to be referr ed
man, 1970),
lSS, togeth er with accom panyin g countr y studie s on Brazil (Bergs
an (Lewis , 1970),
India (Bhagw ati and Desai, ·1970) , Mexico (King, 1970), Pakist
and Taiwan and the Philip pines (Hsing , Power and Sicat, 1970).

It may be

y volume s fully
noted , first of all, that as could be expect ed not all countr
compa rative work;
share precis e critic al stance , nor all of the views, of the
this is partic ularly true for the Bergsm an book.
cal
LSS argue that near- first- best effici ent polici es are more practi
also improv e
than people in develo ping count ries realiz e, and that they would
ve to
income distri butio n. LDC indust ry has been overen courag ed ,relati
be favore d within
agricu lture, they charge , and the select ion of activi ties to
indus try has been carele ss.

They recogn ize some argum ents for specia l

, unskil led
encour ageme nt of indust ry, such as the infant indust ry thesis
ies arisin g
indus trial wages higher than oppor tunity costs, extern al econom
t charge fully,
from knowle dge or traini ng spillo vers for which indust ry canno
and from compl ement arity in indus trial invest ments .

But these and other

argum ents do not neces sarily justif y taxes on foreig n trade.

They recommend,

-28on grounds of wage distortion, the equivalent of a general labor subsidy of
up to 50 per cent, which depending on the labor intensity of each industry,
would imply "promotion" of up to roughly 20 per cent of value added.

Other

arguments could increase the subsidy in rare and ad-hoc cases.up to 50 per cent
of value added, but they expect the average justifiable subsidy to be no more
than about 20 per cent.

They add that in the more advanced developing

countries there may be no justificatio n for promotion at all.

In all cases,

quantitativ e controls would be eventually abolished, or kept for use only
under emergency conditions, and import and export taxes, unless justified on
optimum tariff or fiscal grounds, would be gradually phased out.

Any remaining

import duties would be matched by (equivalent ) internal indirect taxes.

The

exchange rate would be allowed to seek its optimum-tra de equilibrium , with
small but frequent changes if necessary.

The optimum amount of import

substitutio n would then come out as a by-product of this system.
LSS find that the major distortion existing in the seven countries
they and their collaborato rs studied is the very high level of protection
resulting from various forms of restricting imports, and the uneven nature of
such protection.

They blame the use of protection against imports to encourage

industriali zation for a number of undesirable LDC trends.

Industriali zation

policies are said to have aggravated inequalitie s in income, distributio n,
benefiting mainly a small group of industriali sts, plus a working class aristocracy o
Adding insult to injury, it turns out that many "infant" industries are run
by large MNCs.

Untaxed excess profits, which when captured by local entrepreneu rs

represent domestic income redistribut ion, can further tilt the balance toward

an unfavorable national result when those foreign owned activities are heavily
subsidized by protection.

Local industriali sts have not always been induced to

accumulate more domestic capital out of their high profits, choosing instead good
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l~ving more appropr iate to affluen t societie s, or foreign bank accounts .
Tariff levels and structu res, with low duties on capital goods, and
arbitrar y import control rules,·a re said to have encourag ed capital
,intensi ve industri es and techniqu es, as well as widespr ead excess industr ial
capacity , aggrava ting the problem of unemplo yment.

Employment in agricul ture

and labor intensiv e exports , on the other hand, have been discoura ged.
Import controls are said to have induced corrupt ion.
Agricul tural output naturall y has also suffered , and at least in
some countrie s social overhead capital is said to have been neglecte d
due to excessiv e preoccu pation with protecti on and industry .

The bias against

exports created by protecti on, plus overval uation of exchang e rates and
the excessiv e import demand paradox ically generate d by import substitu ting
industr ializati on, led to persiste nt balance of payment s difficu lties, and
to exchange bottlene cks which LSS would not call structu ral.

They also

note that possibi lities for easy import substitu tion would sooner or. later
become exhauste d, but at that point the necessa ry export growth will be
hampere d by expensiv e and shoddy domestic inputs to potenti al exporte rs,
and by overvalu ed exchang e rates inherite d from the earlier stages of

import substitu tion.

In short, many LDCs have neglecte d c.ompara tive

advantag e and have failed to reap the full benefits of a decentr alized price

system.
LSS and the compani on volumes contain gradual istic recomme ndations
for a transiti on period between present and recommended policie s.
question the validity of recorded postwar

LSS also

LDC growth rates, which prima facie

appear historic ally impress ive, and take pains to show that the industr ialized
countrie s never had the astronom ical protecti ve rates register ed now in many

LDCs.

-30The LSS volume brilliant ly captures professio nal exaspera tion with
the errors and missed opportun ities in LDC planning and policy making,
particula rly in trade policy, which accumulat ed during th~ late 1950s and
the 1960s, as LDC exports lagged behind booming world trade.

Had world

trade stagnated during the 1960s, we would now be reviewing books praising
.LDC import substitut ing policies, as indeed such policies are praised for the

1930s.

LSS policy recommen dations do not rely on booming world trade, of

course, and they would argue that under less buoyant circumsta nces their
proposals would have resulted in more healthy import-su bstitution .

But

in the latter case the consequen ces of different choices among trade policies
become relativel y less important thart when world trade is expa~ding vigorousl y.
The LSS volume is not intended as a rigorous presentat ion of either
theory or empirical evidenc~, and it is written with a clear desire to
influence policy·as soon as possible.

This makes it highly readable, given

its subject matter; and influenti al among policy makers.

Sympathy for its

fundamen tal cause, however, should not keep us from listing some criticism s
of it.

Before going into those, it should be noted that LSS attempted , even

if roughly, to translate arguments about externali ties and distortio ns into
concrete quantitat ive justifica tions for different policies.

This deserves

praise, and it is something seldom done by those who casually invoke this or
that imperfect ion to justify just about any level of protectio n, or any other
policy which happens to come into the head of a policy maker to whom they

wish to be sympathe tic.

The leap from vag~e qualitati ve arguments to

impetuous policy advocacy is no monopoly of the orthodox, and raises
important questions regarding the role of theory, and its influence on
policy advice and empirical research.
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It is perhaps the LSS interest in influencing policy which leads them
to couch their presentation too much in terms of old debates, such as
i~dustry vs. agriculture, or free trade vs. protection, rather than exploring
more subtly the various links between trade policy and development.

As

with many other authors (including D{az Alejandro, 1970), they lump together
all features of the "import substitution syndrome," such as import and other
controls, tariffs,overvalued and pegged exchange rates, spectacular balance
of payments crises, inflationary pressures, and stop-go cycles.

Following

a '~uilt by association'' procedure, they the~ tend to blame much of what is

going wrong in LDCs on that ill~defined syndrome.

Unsophisticated readers

may indeed conclude that nearly everything going wrong in LDCs is due to that
wicked syndrome.
Consider a mental experiment:

what would have happened if, say,

Argentina and Colombia, had adopted a policy of flexible exchange rates
back in 1945, while adopting also an across-the-board import tariff of
150 per cent ad valorem? I suspect their record, at least on growth ·and
exports, would have been much better.

Their harmful stop-go policies may

be blamed to a large extent on exchange rate management, as in tha case
of the United Kingdom,and on other short-run policies, that could be analytically
separated from the long run effects of protect~on, although, of course, a more
flexible exchange rate policy will also tend to decrease the political muscle
of protectionists.

Similarly, the effects of the level of protection could

have been separated more clearly in LSS, in a rough quantitative way, from
the impact of dispersion in protective rates, as well as from effects arising
from their year-to-year changes.

-32LSS do note the various aspects of the syndrome, as well as country
to country variations, and are careful to say that problems such as
unemployment or skewed income distribution are aggravated (not created)
by protective policies.

But the reader is left with the impression that

the whole "infamous thing" must be eliminated before LDCs can achieve sound
progress, and that income distribution, the employment picture, administrative
honesty, etc., will be much better if the LSS policy advice is fo.llowed.
The authors further expect X-efficiency and technological change to improve
and accelerate if their policies are followed.

It is perhaps revealing

of the state of our science that LSS decline to quantify the gains countries
may expect from following their policies, and much less enter into a
quantitative separation of the costs of the various syndrome features.

The

impact on world trade which would occur if all LDCs followed the LSS advice
is of course another nice matter left unquantified, although the authors
devote a good chapter to suggest actions by developed countries which could
pave the way for such contingency.
Other attempts to sum up at least parts of the postwar LDC trade and
development experience typically share the LSS stance.

See, for example,

Keesing (1967), Cohen and Ranis (1971), and Schydlowsky (1972).

Discussion

at that level of generality faces sharply diminishing returns, so it is wiser
to turn to the various empirical building blocks of the concensus view to
see how solid are its foundations.
Can LDCs Affect the Level and Composition of their Exports?
Export Pessimism

The 1960s Rout

No complicated models are needed to show that if one expects WC
exports to grow much below their desired GNP growth rates, import substitution,
however induced, will be a very important part of the development program.

-33And if the supply of foreign exchange is, say, perfectly inelastic with respect
to changes in the exchange rate, then import duties and even quotas can be made
to have the same impact on resource allocation, although not on income distrib
ution, as equilibrium exchange rates.

The period between 1914 and 1945 generated

an export pessimism which lasted well into the 1950s, based on two mutually
reinforcing strands of thought.

The supply price

elasticity of exportables

in LDCs, a domestic parameter, was deemed by many to be low due to institutional
rigidities, in the case of rural exportables, or to difficulties of entry and
quality, in the case of non-traditional manufactured goods.

Secondly, both

income and price elasticities of the foreign demand for LDC exports were con
sidered to be very low.

Engel's law, synthetics, etc., were the key code words.

So export pessimists saw little point in trying to use domestic policy tools,
such as the exchange rate, to coax a few more exportables out of inelastic
domestic activities, which were frequently owned either by foreign or by
nationals regarded as socially unprogressive and already above average in income,
only to have to push staples on reluctant foreign buyers, perhaps only after
iminiserizing terms-of-trade declines.
Empirical research has been blasting away those two major props of
export pessimism, at least in their most extreme form.

In the first place,

numerous studies have been produced showing that where markets exist,
i.e., for commercial agriculture, LDC farmers ~ill respond' to relative prices.

Nowshirvani (1971) surveys this literature, noting also that high prices will
induce the spread of markets, so that their total economic effect includes
a movement along a given supply schedule, plus a rightward schedule shift

due to induced organizational changes.

He notes, however, that such total

price responsiveness is far from an unmixed blessing, as the social consequences
of the uncontrolled spread of markets can be quite undesirable.

Econometric

•·

supply response research has become ever more refined, as in Nowshirvani's
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study (1971) for some food crops in northern India, in which subsistence
crops showed no price response, while cash crops generally showed positive
and significant price elasticities of supply.

Also noteworthy is Behrman's

book (1968) on four crops in Thailand using as independent variables not only
mean prices, rut also their variances.

While,in the short run, supply responses

may be weak or even apparently perverse, as with Argentine beef, most
studies show a significant and substantial long run positive supply response
for individual crops and rural activities.

For large groups of such activities,

or for the rural sector as a whole, however, the evidence on price respon
siveness is much less clear.
The trade boom of the 1960s, during which the purchasing power of
nonpetroleum LDC exports rose about three times as rapidly as in the 1950s,
has provided abundant raw materials for empirical workers trying to show
that external der.nand for LDC exports is much more price and income elastic
than the pessimists thought (De Vries, 1967).

Leaving aside old staples,

such as coffee and sugar, whose international marketing can be handled with
ad hoc policies, it has been shown that even within the area of primary
products. all kinds of new DC demands have opened up (Cohen, 1970; but see
Hicks and McNicoll, 1971, who remain skeptical, and warn of resource
exhaustion).

The small share accounted by most LDCs exports of manufactured

goods in total world trade, and the rapid growth of those exports in
"success stories," such as South Korea, have been powerful arguments in
routing both demand and supply pessimism (LSS, Chapter 7).
Cohen and Sisler (1971) have provided a detailed analysis of LDC

world market shares in their major exports during the 1960s.

They show

that for commodities where the growth rate of industrial country imports
from the world was most rapid, LDCs experienced the largest losses in potential
exports, as the result of not maintaining their market share.

They take this

-35fact as prima facie evidence that low LDC export growth rates were due
primarily to domestic supply problems, often induced or aggravated by
incorrect domestic policies, rather than lack of external demand.

An extreme

example of a domestically induced decline in world shares would be the

meat and grain exports of the Argentine Republic; it is hard to believe
in 1973 that quite late into the 1960s many in that country justified just
about any import substituting project on the grounds that there was no future
in world markets for primary products such as beef, corn and wheat.

And as

one watches the U.S., the U.S.S.R., China, Japan and Western Europe plan
growing trade among themselves in cotton, wheat, natural gas and oil, it is
hard to remember that such trade was and is regarded by many as an infallible
symptom of colonial dependency.

Indeed, growing preoccupation in rich countries

about resource exhaustion and undesirable side-effects of synthetics puts us
back, at least f?r a while, in a Neo-Ricardian-Malthusian scenario.

The pessimists also missed the rapid 1960s expansion in the demand
of rich countries for LDC tourist services, which transformed previously
untradeable LDC "home goods" into earners of foreign exchange.

The demand

for LDC tourist services appears to have a high income elasticity, and for

some areas also a high price elasticity.
There is an invincible pessimism even in countries which are now
dramatically expanding their exports, such as Brazil and Colombia, which
argues that the expansion cannot continue, or that it is bound to collapse.
Others simply ignore the facts, and continue to repeat the ! priori
arguments for pessimism, eagerly greeting each new international monetary
storm.

7

Nobody, of course, can say for sure that trade wars among Europe,

Japan and the U.S. could not radically alter the outlook for world trade.
Another view, reflected in Lewis' (1969) second lecture, is that the expected

-36export expansion to DC markets, although substantial, will still not be
enough to achieve LDC growth targets, so further import substitution, at
the regional or all-LDC level, is still required.

He does not, however,

discuss the optimum way of inducing such import substitution.

Helleiner

(1972a, Chapter 2) argues that LDC supply policies and random difficulties
account in large part for country-to-cou ntry differences in export performance,
but only within constraints imposed by traditional world commodity demand
factors.
The direct testing of the link between exchange rate policies and
the supply responses of non-traditiona l LDC exports has generally yielded
significantly positive elasticities, showing that exchange rate policy
typically does matter.
Eaton (1972).

See, for example, the survey and fresh work of

There are, however, some unresolved problems.

While the

time series econometric work shows that the exchange rate matters, it
frequently suggests that it does not matter very much, explaining only a
relatively small part of export growth rates.

Indeed, as the monetarists

would expect, examples of countries which have substantially changed their
real exchange rate for a sustained number of years are few.

More sophisticated

lag structures, exchange rate variances, etc., could in some cases boost the
quantitative weight of exchange rate variables.
For many countries, the stability of the real exchange rate may turn
out to be more important for expanding non-traditiona l exports than the level of
such. a

variable. But the separate effects as well as the interaction of

exchange rate policy with the many other LDC export promotion policies remains

very difficult to quantify, at least using time series.

Halevi (1972) notes

the crucial problem of establishing the functional links betvleen relative
prices and the structure of capital formation, as well as possible scale effects.

-37There is also the fact, emphasized by Krueger's work on Turkish exports
(1972a, Chapter 7), that many LDC exports are determined. mainly by government
domestic policies, e.g., agricultura l policies, as well as by direct public
interventio ns in the export market, rather than by the trade regime itself.
Cross section studies on export performance rarely go beyond
casual empiricism; a promising avenue could be to quantify degrees of under
or over valuation across LDCs, using either a modified purchasing power
parity approach

8

or shadow exchange rate benchmarks, and formally relating

those measures to export performance .
Many promotion policies have a net impact per dollar of exports which
varies substantial ly from industry to industry, or even firm to firm, while
others promote exports mainly by providing market and technical information
inside and outside the country.

The former include tax and credit subsidies,

exemption from import duties, and the creation of free trade zones.

The

latter refer to such things as fairs. and can also include direct government
pressures to export "or else."

Either type of policy presents its own

difficultie s for quantifying supply responses.

As already noted, some

export promotion plans are closely coordinated with policies toward foreign

investors.

As my colleague Benjamin Cohen has pointed out to me, and as

noted long ago by Williams (1929), this complement arity between trade and
capital movements Cvntrasts with the standard textbook thesis that trade
and factor movements are substitutes , as indeed they have been in import
substitutin g activities.
The multiplicit y of export promoting policies has raised the issue
of the effectivene ss of the different instruments in expanding exports.
The example of South Korea (C. Frank, 1972) suggests that export success is
not simply a matter of following neoclassica l textbook recipes.

Export

promotion may involve as much haphazard government interventionism as
import-substitution, (Bhagwati, 1968a).

Cuba offers an extreme example of an

export-promotion strategy with highly centralized socialist planning
techniques.

Thus the issue of the efficiency of the different tools and

techniqµes must also be raised.
It is clear that examples of excesses in export promotion, symmetrical
to excesses in import substitution, can be gi~en at the theoretical as well
as the empirical level.

Bhagwati and Krueger (1972), however, argue

that the situation is unlikely to be wholly symmetrical, and that export
promotion may be the superior strategy.

Generally, the costs of excess

export promotion are more visible to policv makers than those of import
substitution.

An export-oriented strategy typically will rely more on

indirect, rather than direct interventions, and the former is considered to
be typically les.s costly than the latter.

Exporting firms must face price

and quality competition in international markets; insofar as the adverse
side effects of inadequate competition are less severe under the expor~
oriented strategy, export promotion is superior simply because it reduces the
incidence of the problem.

Finally, if there are significant indivisibilities

or economies of scale, an export-oriented strategy will enable firms of
adequate size to realize them.

The various symmetries and asymmetries

between export promotion and import substituting ·strategies are likely to
remain an important research focus.
The spread of preferential trading agreements among LDCs, and between
some DCs and LDCsf presents measurement problems not yet adequately tackled
by the empirical literature on LDC export expansion.

LDC common markets or

free trade areas provide the conditions under which apparent export. expansion
could be hiding the repetition at regional levels of national import
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substitution excesses.

In other words, a dollar earned exporting from

Colombia to Peru, or to Bulgaria, may not be worth as much as a dollar
earned by exporting to Germany, if the former carries with it the
obligation to buy in return goods which are overpriced relative to alternative
least cost sources, while the latter dollar can be used for purchases
anywhere.

Differential effects in other fields, such as employment, could

also be expected between exports to common market partners, or to
centrally planned economies under bilateral arrangements, and those to the
rest of the world.

A related point arises when growing exports are closely

linked to heavy use of imported inputs, as in free trade zones in the
Mexican border with the U.S.

In either circumstance, using gross export

data may yield misleading impressions.
Although customs unions and free trade areas among LDCs have received
a fair amount of theoretical, speculative as well as descriptive attention,
as in Cooper and Massel (1965), Grunwald et. al. (1972), and Morawetz (1972),
analyses of the economic consequences of their actual trade flows have
been relatively rare, perhaps due to their recent creation and/or precarious
existence.

Exceptions include the Hansen (1967) and Willmore (1972) studies

on the Central American Common Market.
Recent Work on Other Perennial Issues of LDC Export Sectors
Two aged theses emphasized by some species of export pessimists have
also come in for rude attack during the 1960s by empirical research and

contemporary reality.

One identified LDC export instability. independent of

trend, as another obstacle to growth. while the other preferred to express
its export pessimism arguing that the long term trend in the terms of trade
for primarv products (or for developing countries) was inevitably downward.

-40Looking at relevant 1946-58 numbers systematically, in an area where
few had done so, MacBean (1966) created a minor scandal when he showed that
export instability was not that much much greater in LDCs than in rich
countries.

Leaving aside such cases as Brazilian coffee and Ghanian cocoa,

he also argued that primary product exports are no more unstable than
manufactured exports.

When data showed acute export fluctuations, he found

that domestic factors, including weather, pests, political turmoil and

economic errors, rather than shifts in world demand, were responsible.
Finally, there was little econometric evidence showing a significant link
between export instability and the stability and growth of GDP and capital
formation.
-

Examining the period 1950-66, Massel (1970) tested a number of
possible explanations for export instability in rich and poor countries.
The only variables showing significant coefficients are concentration in
few export products, increasing instability, while absolutely large export
sectors and unusual reliance on food exports are associated with less
instability.

A result related to the absolute size of the export sector is

that of Erb and Schiavo-Campo (1969), who for 1954-66 found a negative

correlation among LDCs between export instability and .the absolute size of
their GDPs.

These authors also found that between 1946-58, the MacBean

period, and 1954-66, there had been an important.decline in export instability
both in LDC and in rich countries, but in the latter more than in the former.
Kenen and Voivodas (1972) concluded that the choice among various

methods of measuring export instability and among plausible country samples
do not affect their major results, which on the whole agree with those of
MacBean.

Results, however, are somewhat more sensitive to the choice of

time period.

For example, contrary to MacBean, they find a strong and
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plausible negative connection between export instability and the level of
investment.duri ng the 1960s, which reopens the question of the extent and
mechanisms through which export instability reduces investment levels.
Mathieson and McKinnon (1972) focus on the instability not only
of exports and aggregate GDP, but also on that of several GDP components,
arguing that measurement techniques tend to misleadingly hide important
LDC instability in large aggregates.

They find that LDC instability is

indeed substantially larger than in rich countries, but that there is no
persuasive evidence that the international economy generally exerted a net
destabilizing influence on LDCs from 1950 to 1968, partly due to the fact
that rich countries during these years did not experience their business
cycles in unison.

Mathieson and McKinnon find that instability decreases

with per capita income, but contrary to Erb and Schiavo-Campo, they find
that the country size....e!E ~• as measured by absolute GDP levels, bears
no significant link with instability.

They also obtain some weak evidence

indicating that the more open an economy is, as measured by the ratio of
exports to GDP, the lower the instability will be.

Although that link is

not strong statistically, they certainly can say that there is no basis
in their results for supporting the traditional view linking instability

with openers and outward looking trade policies.
The main thrust of the above is to undercut general contemporary
arguments for international commodity schemes and for restrictionist and

interventionis t domestic trade policies, justified ~y the alleged harmful
effects of presumed export instability on LDC economies.

Ad hoc cases of

instability which require particular policies, of course, just as ad hoc
grounds for optimum export taxes, are not weakened by the surveyed results.
Studies of pre-World War II LDC export instability should yield interesting
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results, a~d are likely to indicate that declines in that instability, and
of

its negative impact on development, are due to improved macro and

sectoral economic management both in developed and developing countries.
As noted by Helleiner (1972, Chapter 5), the focus on exports as
a source of instability in LDC economies has been usually based on the
belief that other elements in aggregate demand within those countries
were not as important, in the short run, in determining the level of aggregate

economic activity.

LDC exports are supposed to influence economic activity

not only via demand effects, but also through their effects on feasihle
import supplies.

At least for the study of business cycles in the larger

LDCs, such traditional focus is clearly out of date.

The fact that in

many LDCs imports show greater instability than exports cannot be explained
without a closer examination of the interplay between domestic policy
instruments, including monetary and fiscal policy, not only with external
demand conditions, but also with the use of foreign trade policy instruments,
particularly the exchange rate.

The stop-go macro policies which have been

observed in several semi-industrialized countries and the induced domestic
instability have more to do with the sporadic and reluctant way in which
devaluations have been handled, than with disturbances arising in world
markets.

In other words, postwar instability in, say, Ar.gentine or Turkish

investment, particularly in construction, has a lot in common with that found
in the United Kingdom, a hypothesis hardly illuminated by the traditional
focus on export instability.
Theoretical and empirical work on the determinants of secular trends
for LDC terms of trade, so popular during the 1950s, was on the whole
neglected during the 1960s, perhaps due to general agreement that the terms
of trade, whatever their trend, were not the key variables to focus on when

-43discussing trade policy and development.

On the theoretical front, the works

of Arthur Lewis (1969) and Emmanuel (1972) have already been mentioned.

Lewis

adds to his theoretical model a historical-empirical test, concluding that
the reason tropical countries were experiencing in 1965 net barter terms of
trade,which were unfavorable compared with the situation before the First
World War, was fundamentally that the world price of wheat had risen less
than the price of manufactures, due to sharp increases in U.S. argicultural
productivity in the context of relative immobility of farm populations
(pp. 24-25).
Emmanuel presents a Marxian model of the terms of trade, based on
the labor theory of value, which has a number of similarities with the
Lewis view, anchored in "unlimited'' supplies of labor generated by low

productivity LDC subsistence food sectors, and with the Kindleberger (1956)
emphasis on LDC-rich countries terms of trade, rather than on those between
primary and manufactured products.

Emmanuel also emphasized the relatively

greater international mobility of capital, which could include huma.n_ capital,
contrasted with the contemporary international immobility of unskilled labor.
Empirical work on terms of trade based on the "unequal exchange" thesis has
been mostly polemical; of particular interest is the use made by Rumanians
of this thesis in their arguments with COMECON, as described by Montias (1967,
Chapter 4).

In this debate, the less developed Rumanians argued that they

had to spend more labor time to produce a unit of value at world prices, than,
say the Czechs .who produce their exports with higher labor productivity.
Not surprisingly, the Czechs argued that so long as world prices were free of
monopolistic elements, there was nothing exploitative about such a situation.
One may remark, in passing, on the curious fact that some of the Western
observers who are most admiring of the protectionist Rumanians, are the same
who sneer with most zeal at LDC inward-oriented policies.
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On the empirical front, nothing as monumental as Kindleberger's
(19~6) terms of trade study has been forthcoming during the 1960s.

Besides

the empirical aspects of the Lewis lectures, the Porter _study (1970) of
postwar primary product price movements may be mentioned.

For the period

between the late 1940s through the early 1960s he documents a generally
falling trend for the prices of forty-six primary products.

He also finds

that demand for primary products typically may be very price-inelastic,££
very income-inelastic, but not both.

In an interpretation in line with that

of Lewis, he suggests that the greater ability of the advanced countries
to raise productivity in primary products, presumably non-tropicals, is part
of the explanation of their increasing domination of the more income-elastic
products, a domination which has tended to increase since the late 1930s.
Evenson (1973), in turn, suggests that differential productivity advances

are partly expl~ined by variations in expenditures on agricultural research
and development, a field in which many LDCs have seriously lagged, particularly
outside traditional staples.
The recovery of LDC terms of trade since the early 1960s, perhaps a
partly offsetting consequence of past import substitution excesses, may also

account for the recent scarcity of te~ms of trade studi~s. and the quiet
filing of policy proposals linking terms of trade movements to domestic or
international (e.g., aid) policies.

On the other hand, the spectacular

success of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries has encouraged
those wishing to use commodity agreements to raise selected LDC export
prices, while alarming some who only a few years ago emphasized LDC impotence
to do fny such thing.
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Managing LDC Foreign Exchange Availabilities during the Postwar: Mechanisms
for Suppressing Import Demand and their Consequences
Even if the supply of foreign exchange had a zero elasticity with
respect to the export exchange rate, the precise nature of the trade regime
and of the mechanisms used to repress import demand could have important
repercussions for efficiency, income distribution and growth.

For many LDCs,

their postwar trade regimes, featuring differential import exchange rates,
high and uneven import duties, import and exchange controls, and prior
import deposits, in fact evolved from their policy reaction to the Great
Depression of the 1930s, when their supply of foreign exchange was highly
inelastic to their export exchange rate, if indeed it did not have a negative
elasticity.

But once such complex restrictionist regimes were in place,

first legitimized by the balance of payments crisis, they gradually took
on a more openly protectionist nature.
The measurement of the costs and consequences of tariff protection
is to be discussed in detail elsewhere in this volume, so two long paragraphs
on the subject will suffice here.

The use during the 1960s of the concept

of effective rates of protection provided additional quantification tools

which documented and dramatized, first, the high and uneven nature of LDC
tariff structure, and later, the similar characteristics of the overall net
impact of all the import repressing mechanisms.

The recent work of Balassa

and Associates (1971) summarizes and extends this type of research.

Of the

six LDCs studies in depth, Balassa finds a considerable degree of discri,n
ination in favor of manufacturing and against primary activities in four of
them, which also have the largest interindustry variation in effective rates
of protection.

Such variation, it is argued, is not the result of conscious

and systematic planning decisions, a conclusion also reached by the Desai
(1970) study of the Indian tariff commission.

There may be, however, some

-46politic al method in such econom ic madnes s.

For the cases of Mexico and

Pakista n, Balassa found large differe nces between rates of tariff and
implic it
protec tio~ showing that tariff data will not by itself approp riately
describ e
the structu re of protec tion in countr ies which employ quanti tative
restric tions
to limit. imports .
Anothe r approac h for measur ing the extent and conseq uences of trade
restric tionis t regimes was pioneer ed by Bruno (1967) and Kruege r (1966),
using the concep t of domest ic resourc e costs, whose differe nces and
simila rities

with that of effecti ve rates of protec tion have recent ly been explore
d
(Bruno , 1972, and Kruege r, 1972b) . · In her in-dep th study of ten Turkish
indust ries, Kruege r found a signifi cant gap in real domest ic resourc
e
costs per dollar earned or saved between the lowest cost -impor t-subst
itution
activi ty and the most costly potent ial export indust ry.

She also found a

spread of about 'ten to one between the highes t (an import substit ution
firm)
and lowest (a potent ial export firm) domest ic resourc e costs estima
ted.
Yet, she notes that Turkish trade policie s removed virtua lly all
incenti ve

for the potent ial export firms studied .

Rejecti ng export pessimi sm, she

tentati vely sugges ts that twice as much output , in value terms, could
be
obtaine d from new resourc es with a liberal ized trade regime and an
equilib rium
exchan ge rate.

Her results , of course , depend h~avil y on 'the across- the-bo ard

applic ation of the small country assump tion to all Turkish activi ties,
as

well as on the assump tion of consta nt costs.

Other related detaile d studies

of the impact of restric tionis t trade regimes in LDCs include those
of
S. R. Lewis for Pakista n (1969),

L. L. Johnson for the Chilean automo bile

indust ry (1967), and Baranso n for a larger sample of automo bile firms
in
LDCs (1969) .
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A good part of the typical LDC restrictive trade regime relies not
on general signals transmitted via tariffs and subsidies, nor through clear
and universal administrative rules, but on a maze o~
decisions and obscure rules of thumb.

~

hoc bureaucratic

Not without reasons, most researchers

have_ tended to stay away from a careful study of such disconcerting reality,

preferring to handle them with a few well chosen critical generalizations,
sure to be received with approval by the rest of the profession.

Writers

associated with Anglo-Saxon traditions have usually found the labyrinths
of quantitative controls somewhat more Kafkaesque than authors used to
Latin bureaucracies did, which, as Italy shows, may be compatible with and may
survive economic development.

But serious studies of these matters have

begun to appear, as may be seen in Chapters 15 and 16 of the Bhagwati and
Desai volume for India (1970), and Chapter 8 in the new Krueger study of
Turkey (1972a):

More should be on the way from studies on exchange control,

liberalization, and economic development, sponsored by the National Bureau
of Economic Research (Bhagwati and Krueger, 1972).

Even more than with tariff

protection, it is generally agreed that quota protection has been generally
granted and used indiscriminately.
Administrative import and exchange controls are typically blamed for

a large number of inefficiencies, many difficult to quantify.
red tape are said to:

Their delays and

waste private and public enterpreneurial time and

energy; require additional clerical staff to handle paperwork, in both
government and industry; give rise to other extra expenses (e.g., flying
back and forth to capital cities to deal with bureaucrats); lead to excessive
domestic inventories; have peculiar rules of thumb stimulating overbuilding,
capital intensity, and excess capacity; favor large firms and discriminate
against new and small entrepreneurs; encourage administrative corruption

and smuggling; help to extinguish competition and technological change in
domestic markets; slow down the inflow of foreign technology; arbitrarily
alter the composition of imports; encourage industrial concentration in
the capital city; and, of course, lose potenti~l tax revenue for the state.
Solid empirical documentation of these chirges is -~till scanty.
One suspects that some of the generalizations may rely too much on the
complex psychology of Indian civil servants. Brazilian and Colombian postwar
import controls, for example, did not have the same tendency displayed by
those of India to rigidly use installed capacity as criteria to allocate
import permits, nor to encourage machinery as compared to intermediate
imports in the face of excess capacity due to input shortages.

Perhaps the

costs of administrative controls become very high only for very large
countries and/or when too little reliance is placed on other, more orthodox,
import repressing mechanisms.
At any rate, the key question continues to be how different things
would be if controls are replaced by the other mechanisms.

Noting that

under import c9ntrols, for example, 100 large firms receive 50 per cent of a
country's import permits hardly proves that controls lead to economic
concentration, although it may show that controls do not prevent concentration.
Observing that import controls coexist with exces~ capacity or corruption
is also not very enlightening.

One would have to show, or give persuasive

reasons indicating that matters would be different in an LSS world, or that
they are different in countries without such controls (adjusting for other
differences!).

More on this in the next section.

The study of import control mechanisms has typically focused on
merchandise trade, often leaving aside importsof services.

Yet the handling

of service payments usually offers prima facie evidence of gross inefficiencies

-49as well as inequities.

Without paying the equivalent of import duties,

the followi~g frequently have access, even if linited, to foreign exchange
at overvalued exchange rates:

foreign investors in import substituting

activities, tourists, parents of students abroad, users of foreign ships,
and users of foreign patents.

Particularly in the field of optimal control

of technological services imports, where world markets can hardly be said
to be competitive, much empirical and theoretical work remains to be done,
in spite of the pioneering work of Vaitsos

(1970) and Katz (1972).

One subject receiving increasing empirical attention is that of
illicit transactions, primarily under restrictionist trade regimes.

Such

illicit transactions include old-fashioned smuggling, inward and outward,
and under- or overinvoicing, of imports and exports, as a way to avoid

exchange controls and other departures from unified and equilibrium exchange
rates.

When considering alternative trade policies, their vulnerability

to evasions and corruption is an important consideration (Bhagwati, 1968a).

Going beyond unreliable anecdotes, systematic empirical work in this area

includes that of Bhagwati on alleged Turkish fake invoicing (1969), which
uses partner-country trade data to obtain presumptive evidence on the degree
of faking going on.

For the Pakistani case, Winston (1970) found that the

effective price to the firm

at

imported capital goods was .reduced by more than

45 per cent, as compared against its recorded value, as a result of fake
overinvoicing of those goods, and subsequent illegal exchange transactions.
More is expected from the NBER project already mentioned, and from a

collection of papers on the subject edited by Bhagwati.

It may be noted

that trade policies vulnerable to corruption and evasion include not only
those for which there exists a negative prima facie economic argument.

For example, Colombian and Ghanaian export taxes on coffee and cocoa, respectively,

-sowhich could be defended on optimum tariff grounds are bedevilled by outward
smuggling as much as less defensible export taxes.
Much of the 1960s debate on LDC trade policies suffered from the
use of terms such as import-substitu tion, protection, promotion, etc.,
whose exact definitions were often ambiguous.

The typical definition of

import substitution, that used by Chenery (1960), was devoid of welfare
implications.

The proportion of total supply of a particular good obtained

via imports rather than from domest'ic production can decrease, i.e., import
substitution occurs, either because a tariff is placed on that good, or
because devaluation makes imports more expensive, or for a number of other
reasons.
Desai (1969) clarified and called attention to possible alternative
definitions of import substitution, some based on optimality notions, and
explored various ways of actually calculating the purely descriptive measure.
Alternative descriptive statistical procedures arise from different ways
of handling departures from base year import-availab ility ratios, degrees
of aggregation, and ways of handling intermediate demands generated by import
substitution.

~

Both Desai and Diaz-Alejandro (1970, Chapter 4) noted the

importance of aggregation.

The commonly heard remark that import substitution

has stopped in many LDCs because they have been unable to 'lower their aggregate
ratio of ·imports to supplies can hide two conflicting tendencies:

an

across-the-boa rd decline in each industry's imports-to-sup plies ratio, and
an increase in the weights of the more import intensive industries, which
may benefit from high income elasticities of demand.

-51~orl~y and Smith (1970) note that a given imported good substitutes
for the ot1t·;,ut of many domestic value adding activities. and that the
standard measures for import substitution in a given sector do not quantify
the t"wo components of total supply. imports and domestic production. on the
same gross production rasis.

They show for the Brazilian case that the

usual measures underestimate import substitution by domestic intermediate
goods i~Justries. which now supply intermediate value added previously
cmlodied in imports.
After the Rout:

The New Trade Policies and Development

In spite of theoretical and empirical lacunae. on the whole evidence
does appear robust for the proposition that trade policies in many LDCs
during the 1950s and the 1960s left much to be desired.

But even under the

assumptions that world trade will continue to expand. i.e., that no new
1929s are to be feared, and that most LDCs have now a varietv of policv
tools and choices. allowing them to tackle distortions directlv. important
research and policv questions remain:

How easy or difficult is the

transition ·between old and new trade policies. both economically and
politically7 Haw far must old policies be dismantled and new ones installed
to achieve significantly positive developmental results?

Even if the old is

totally abandoned, how much can 1'e expected frbm the new trade policies?
Starting already in the late 1950s. ma~y of the semi-industria lized
LDCs attempted to liberalize their restrictive trade regimes. while in

some cases attempting to check inflation.

"Liberalization " is here defined

in the Bha~1ati-Kruege r (1972) sense; it is said to be attempted when there

exists the intention to let the official price of foreign exchange assume an
increased role in the domestic alloc.ation of resources.

Diaz-Alejandro (1965)
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exam ined the painf ul Arge ntine stab iliza tion and
liber aliza tion attem pts
up to that date, focus ing on the large redis tribu
tions of incom e trigg ered
by mass ive deva luati ons, and the unsu rpris ing
failu re of dome stic supp lies
to respo nd quick ly to highl y unsta ble relat ive
price s.

The stop- go macro

polic ies arisi ng from the comm itmen t to a pegge
d rate, ~por adica lly and
dram atica lly deval ued every two or three years
, were also analy zed in that
book. The Turk ish case, as that of Arge ntina ,
also illus trate s the diffi culty
of isola ting trans ition al probl ems due to fight
ing infla tion, from those
arisi ng from liber aliza tion (Krue ger, 1972a , Chap
ter 4). This, of cours e.
is relat ed to the diffi culty of parc ellin g blame
for exces s costs betwe en
uneve n infla tion and restr ictiv e trade regim es
while that not unusu al
comt inatio n is in full bloom .
Somewhat diffe rent issue s have been raise d by
the analy sis of the
1966 India n deva luati on (Bhag wati and Srini vasa
n, 1973 c). In that case, as in
the Turk ish 1958 deva luati on, the impa ct of the
parit y chang e was more than
offse t by the reduc tion and remo val of surch arges
, taxes and expo rt prem ia,
leadi ng to a majo r diffe rence betwe en nomi nal
and effec tive deva luati ons.
This leads to confu sion in publi c opini on, when
the nomi nal deva luati on is
asses sed as if it were also an effec tive deva
luati on. The 1966 India n case
also illus trate s the dang ers of liber alizi ng
unde r press ure from aid dono rs,
and the impo rtanc e of timin g liber aliza tion attem
pts with relat ively favor able
exoge nous facto rs. e.g., good harv ests and terms
of trade . These two poin ts
are also hi~1l y relev ant for studv ing the shor
t run failu re of the Colom bian
1965- 66 lil-e raliz ation attem pt, and the frict ion
betwe en manv Latin Amer ican
gover nmen ts and insti tutio ns such as the I.M.F
. The links betwe en aid.
liber aliza tion and stab iliza tion in Latin Amer
ica have been exam ined with
parti cula r verve by Hayt er (1971 ).

Cooper's (1971a and 1971c) impressive review of about three dozen
recent devaluations in developing countries also concludes emphasizing
that managing a devaluation through the transition phase to final success
requires both judgment and delicacy of handling.

He confirms that although

the price level often rises, real aggregate demand frequently falls following
a devaluation, and so does the public official linked to the devaluation
decision.
By now there is general agreement that stabilization and liberal
ization attempts should be managed gradually (LSS, Chapter 10); few share the
1950s and early 1960s orthodox enthusiasm for shock therapy, which left more
than one patient wondering whether the net present discounted benefits of the
cure were higher than the present discounted costs of the disease.

The

recessionary tendencies which frequently accompany stabilization and
liberalization' plans, contrary to what is expected from devaluation and
resource allocation theory, and which occur even as the rise in the price

level accelerates,

9

have been blamed on a variety of factors, which seem

to operate with different force from country to country.

Large redistribution

of income may transfer purchasing power from those with high to those with

low propensities to spend on locally produced goods.

The rise in domestic

prices of tradeable goods triggered by devaluation will exert downward
pressure on real cash balances, a tendency which may be aggravated by overly
restrictive fiscal and monetary policies.

In LDCs with rigid and segmented

capital markets, this can put severe strains on various compartments of the
credit market, such as those providing working capital for industrial firms,
and for housing and construction, leading to supply-induced output declines,
besides the standard cash-balance effects.

-54Cooper (1971b) also notes how devaluation can lower aggregate
demand in aid-receiving countries, acting essentially as an excise tax,
at least in the short run, and explores wealth effects arising from devaluations
in countries with foreign debts.

There may also be simply an asymmetrical

response to the new incentive structure:

sectors subject to new negative

signals rnav pick up those more quickly and effectively than those which
should be expanding in response to positive signals.
Not all stabilization and liberalization attempts have led to
catastrophe, even if all had to undergo difficulties, and research on
happier experiences can tell us something regarding the other two questions
raised at the beginning of this section.

A major point emerging from the

successful cases, as noted before, is that to reach rapid growth in exports
it was not necessary to dismantle totally the paraphenalia of controls
inherited from the stage of import substitution, nor to enter fully into an
orthodox neoclassical, decentralized world.

Indeed, as shown in the cases of

South Korea (Frank, 1972) and, more recently, Colombia, many administrative
rules can be quickly turned around and used to encourage new exports, just

as before they were used to promote new import-replacing activities.

The

authorities, in fact, can use existing market distortions. e.g., in the
credit market. to give their export promoting policies greater leverage.
As shown by the post-1967 Brazilian example, it -is not even necessary to
eliminate inflation, or even lower it below fifteen .per cent per annum, to
generate an export boom.

Many successful liberalization attempts did not

really try to eliminate or massively reduce protection to trulv import-competing
industries. limiting import liheralization efforts mainlv to those goods and
services which do not compete with established domestic industry (Michaely,
1973).

At any rate, the least-risk strategy is clearly to first get exports

up and then liberalize imports.

as many thought a few years ago.

This does not appear to be as difficult

-55The above gives substance to the earlier suggestion that concept
ualization of trade and development problems of many LDCs is on firmer
ground in three sector models, with some factor market imperfections, in which
the competition for resources between the export and the import-competing
sectors is mitigated by the existence of a home good or subsistance sector
which can gradually yield resources to both (if the price is right.)
The view of liberalization, which is gradualist regarding its
timing and marginalist (!) with respect to the degree of change needed in
policy instruments to achieve higher export growth rates, gets some support
from the argument (Schydlowsky, 1972; Dudley, 1972) that a large number of
LDC import substituting industries developed during the last thirty years are
not as inefficient, uncompetitive and technologically stagnant as the most
extre~e critics of import substitution suggest.

One need not argue, as

some do, that ~he stage of import substitution was a necessary precondition
to the development of new exports, to notice that much of the productive
capacity created during that stage can be turned around fairly readily toward
export expansion.

This argument, of course, while tending to decrease the

urgency of drastic changes, also indicates that full adoption of neoclassical
policies, including devaluations which will partly compensate lower protection,

will only hurt the real white elephants, which may not be so many.
This view implies that LDC postwar growth rates have been, after all,
10
.
most 1y rea 1 , even measure d at wor ld prices.

Another reason why even LDCs

convinced of the excesses of past policies and the need for greater exports,
may be reluctant to abandon suddenly all exchange and other controls is
simply the fact that as one looks around the world in early 1973 one observes
many developed countries returning to such practices as exchange controls
and dual exchange rates, not to mention wage-price controls.
world, it may be wise to hang on to a variety of policy tools.

In an uncertain

A lesson emerging from both successful and unsuccessful liberalization
attempts, par~icularly in medium and large countries subject to inflationary
pressures, is the great importance of.handling devaluations using crawling
pegs, rather than the Bretton Woods system of infrequent and large parity
changes.

Brazilian and Colombian growth rates for exports and GNP, for

example, have recently become not only higher but also less unstable, and

their crawling pegs seem to have more to do with those results than any
profound revision of their protectionist system (Donges, 1971).

In other

words, improved short term macroeconomic and balance of payments management

in inflation-prone semi-industrialized LDCs may explain a larger share of
their higher growth rates than that attributable to the presumed reallocation
of resources from inefficient import substitution activities toward efficient
export lines.
The new policies are clearly yielding higher per capita growth rates
in capitalistic LDCs as diverse as South Korea, Brazil, Taiwan and Colombia.
Higher exports have permitted sharply expanded levels of machinery and
equipment imports and, therefore, of capital formation.

It is noteworthy

that Cuban economic authorities, not widely regarded as orthodox neoclassicists,
put great emphasis on the link between expanding exports and growing capital

formation, leading to a domestic resource allocation and~ _plan which can
be characterized as an export-oriented staple growth strategy.
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But the

impact of new trade policies on domestic savings, besides those operating
via the easier import of capital goods. are unclear, and appear secondary
to results flowing from policies regarding local capital markets.
Evidence on whether the new policies are reducing the marginal capital
output ratio, and if so, through which mechanisms, is not yet robust.
growth rates, by themselves, are known to reduce that ratio.

Higher

But the new

policies could further reduce it by improving resource allocation

-57(Krueger, 1972a, Chapter 9), and by using up excess capacity.

Reduction of

average excess capacity, in turn, can result from the dampening of stop-go
cycles, and/or from the elimination of mechanisms through which protectionist
trade regimes allegedly stimulated idle installed capital.
The study of excess capacity in LDCs has picked up considerable
steam recently (Winston, 1971; Thoumi, ,1972; and Calvo,

1972).

But the

precise extent to which incorrect LDC trade policies can be blamed for such
idle capacity remains obscure.

There are several complementary explanations

for excess capacity, and many have little or nothing to do with trade policies.
It does seem plausible that excess profits induced or renewed by protection
could lead to excess entry and Chamberlinian coexistence, ~r that due to

small domestic market size and indivisibilities many import replacing
projects may have a capaci~y unlikely to be fully used for many years.

But

the quantitative impact of these and other hypotheses is far from established.
Similar considerations apply to the impact of the new trade policies
on LDC employment.

Krueger (1972a, Chapter 9) shows that if Turkish

manufacturing investment had been allocated following sectoral shares in
value added or investmer.t in 1963, instead of following the development plan,
the same investment volume would have generated greatly increased manufacturing
employment opportunities, besides reducing marginal capital-output ratios
and import requirements (see also Power and Sicat, 1971).

The evidence on

employment growth in Taiwan and South Korea is also impressive (Ranis, 1972),
but once again it is difficult to sort out exactly that part which can be
credited to higher growth rates of aggregate output, from other effects, such

as changing output composition, changing capital-labor ratios, etc.
Sweeping the Leontief

paradox under the carpet, even though Baldwin

(1971) has pinpointed its source mainly on U.S. trade with Canada, Oceania

-58a~d LDCs, we tend to assume that new LDC exports will be lahor intensive,
although there are skeptics, such as Sheahan (1~71).

As many such exports,

even those going to world markets and not to free trade area partners, come
from large firms, often foreign, which have also been active in import
substitution, the skepticism regarding the q·uantitative impact on employment
· is
.
f urt h er Justi
.
. f ie
· d . 12
o f t h e c h ange i n output mix

Differences in capital-

labor ratios between large and small firms within the same industry can he
larger than such differences between sectors.

Furthermore, a good share of

the new exports are made up, directly or indirectly, by land-intensive primary
products, whose labor use may or may not be greater than in labor substituting
activities.
There is, after all, one small country "success story" which

has

for a long time followed free trade policies at least vis-~-vis a major
industrial center, and where unemployment continues to be a serious problem.
The case of Puerto Rico could also be fruitfully used as a near-free-trade
comparative benchmark for excess capacity, capital-intensity and income
distribution studies, even though (or perhaps because) that island has other
notorious market imperfections (L. Reynolds and Gregory, 1965).

It should

also be noted that there are other sound theoretical reasons. besides sticky
wages, to expect some LDC unemployment even in small countries following

· optima~ trade policies (Fields, 1972).

Furthermore, fast export expansion

could lead to a relaxation, in some LDCs, of controls over imports of labor
replacing machinery.
As in the case of LDC rural supply responses, evidence has been
accumulating showing that substitution possibilities between capital and

labor in LDC productive activities are generally not zero (Clague, 1969;
Fei and Ranis, 1971).

But beyond this weak statement, interpretations

differ and generalizations become shakier; Behrman, for example, interprets his

-59estimates (1972) to imply that Chilean flexibility in response to changes
in internation al markets is limited and that adjustment takes a long
time, giving some support to the structurali st view.

Behrman also concludes

that Eckaus' technologic al explanation for LDC unemploymen t is supported
by his results, and finds that sectors generally thoiight to serve as the
predominant absorbers of surplus labor are among those with most limited
estimated substitutio n possibiliti es.
-

Firmer answers to the above doubts should also help settle the
quantificat ion of how LDC income distributio ns are likely to react to the
new trade policies.

As with industrial structure and concentrati on ratios,

differences in income distributio n turned up by cross section studies are not
plausibly explained by differences in trade policies (R. Weisskoff, 1970)_
Even the allegedly favorable Taiwanese income distributio n could have more to
do with previous land and educational reforms than with trade policies.
Note that even if the new trade policies trigger massive labor-inten sive
exports, they are also likely to accelerate GNP growth, and periods of growth
acceleratio n are generally regarded as conducive to growing inequality
(Despres, 1973).
Schumpeter.

It is not clear that Stolper-Sam uelson will dominate

Furthermore , new land-intens ive primary product exports often

come from LDCs where land ownership is far fro.m evenly distributed .

These

skeptical remarks can be extended to the impact of the new trade policies

on regional distributio ns of income and economic activities.
Whether the new trade policies and higher exports significant ly
stimulate X-efficienc y and technologic al change remains also an empirically
open and researchabl e question.

Much seems to depend on the institution al

environment in which the new exports are being generated, and on what is
regarded as the likely alternative scenario.

For example, if those exports

-60are mainly forthcoming from foreign firms training large numbers of local
workers and managers. who rapidly leave to work for local firms, the
diffusion of new techniques will be greater than if such turnover is low
(Cohen, 1972a).
'

1

know-how"

But foreign firms whose great asset is typically

are unlikely to go out of their way to promote the spread and

difussion of the knowledge on which their power is based.

The mechanism

through which the bargain on patents and licenses for new exports is
struck, and differences it may present with the equivalent process for import
substitution, is also obviously important.

Will foreign firms spend more

on adapting to local conditions in export or in import substitution
activities, and what does that imply for domestic welfare?

Will the new

'\

price structure arising from the reformed trade policies induce local and
foreign entrepreneurs to search for "right" innovations in significant
amounts, even if· credit and labor markets remain imperfect?
But the. most fundamental doubts about the new trade policies arise
not on purely economic grounds, but on those related to fuzzier, but no
less important, developmental targets and aspirations.

The large role of

foreign investors in new export activities, larger perhaps in Latin America
than in the Far East, has been already documented (Vernon, 1971) and is
likely to become greater than it was under the import substitution strategy
(Helleiner, 1973; de la Torre, 1972).

Many LDC exports will consist not

of finished products, but of semi-finished commodities, which are also
imported in a somewhat less finished state, both being part of vertically
integrated international industries.

As workers in an assembly line, LDCs

will have in those cases little knowledge of what comes before or after
them in the production process, a knowledge which will be reserved for those
running the whole operation from abroad.

Thus, even as LDC control over

their traditional natural resource exports tends to grow, their control over

-61new exports could start from a very low base, renewing a sense of dependency
and frustration.
If large exports of labor-intensive exports materalize, the need
for wage and labor "discipline" will grow, a discipline likely to be exerted
either by the reserve army of the employed or, particularly when surplus
labor dries up, by the other army.

Indeed, it is quite disconcerting that

neoclassical liberal policies are more often than not pursued by LDC regimes
with notoriously illiberal politics, while democratic LDC governments
typically provide a good share of horror-show inefficiency stories.
also a bit unseemly that some of those eager

It is

to promote the new exports, and

who become outraged at income inequalities arising from the higher wages of
the ''aristocracy of the proletariat," appear to get much less excited about
other income inequalities.
Concluding remarks
The scholarly research community should he kept busy docume~ting

and analyzing the various possihle developmental consequences of the new

LDC trade policies.
data base.

The task must include improving and extending the available

In particular, fresh insights are most likely to come from dis

aggregate3 and sample data than from further manipulation of rather dog-eared
national accounts and other macroeconomic aggregates.

In the meanwhile, as

· always, LDC trade policies will react, and should react, to trends in the
world economy.

In spite of recurrent monetary crises and threats of commercial

wars among the rich, the LDCs face a world market on the whole prosperous
and diversified.

It is in their interest to stimulate such diversification,

and in particular, to fight trends toward domination of the world market for
trade, finance and technology by either a few countries or a few MNCs.

In

trade policy discussions, it is frequently too glibly assumed that domestic

-62monopoly problems can be resolved simply by putting down import barriers
and letting "world competiti on" do the job.

Alas, in some sectors even the

whole market may not be big and diversifi ed enough to result in sufficien t
competiti on.

LDC investmen ts in expanding their own networks of informati on

and intelligen ce gathering about imperfect and uncertain world markets for
commodid ites, technolog y and finance, i.e., a kind of LDC "Consumer Reports,"
should become a key element of their "trade policies. "

LDCs could profitabl y

rethink their acceptanc e of world arrangeme nts, such as the Paris patents
conventio n, which appear to benefit mainly the rich.

LDCs also have an

interest in new internati onal monetary rules which minimize the possibili ty
that rich countries will thrust the burden of adjusting their balance of
payments on.to LDCs.

Sudden unilatera l import surcharge s, defaults on the

converti bility of debts, etc., are no monopoly of LDCs, as recent actions by
rich countries ,faced with payments problems show. 13
How far the rich will be willing to accommod ate their economies to
new LDC exports remains a difficult matter to forecast exactly.

Yet a good

share of the heated debate on how far LDCs should go in adopting this or
that trade policy typically depends on often implicit assumptio ns regarding
world demand.

The key ''staple" for many contempo rary LDCs is

simply

unskilled labor, and, particula rly for the large LDCs, it is unlikely that
exports of this "staple" can reach the relative developm ental significa nce
which wheat, timbe~, meat, etc., had last century for the developme nt of the
success stories of that time, whose populatio ns represent ed tiny fractions
of world totals.

It is also unclear how far the rich will permit those LDCs,

choosing to be outward-o riented in trade

but reluctant to permit foreigner s

to handle their new cxports,t o take advantage of wealthy markets.

Yet this

combinati on is perhaps the most appealing to LDCs worried about both exchange

earnings and national autonomy (Myint, 1969).

In view of these uncertainti es,

LDCs would do well to continue working toward the creation and expansion
of common markets among themselves, hopefully in ways which minimize repetltion
of the past errors in import substitutio n.
Much empirical research on the exact impact of the new export expansion
on the growth, employment, income distributio n and national autonomy of
different ty~es of LDCs remains to be done.

But it should be added that the

14
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h as not b een a pyrr h.1c victory,
.
rout o f export pessimism
nor are t h e

achievement s in the recent trade and development literature to be dismissed
lightly.

The air has been cleared of nightmarish myths dreamed up mainly in

the 1930s, and important analytical tools have been developed to help LDC
authorities to avoid, if political will exists, at least the worst errors in
evaluating projects related to the foreign sector (Bacha and Taylor, 1971;
Little and Mirr~ees, 1969).

Suitably employed, economists who know the shadow

price of everything and the social worth of nothing ace more useful than
bureaucrats

who know neither.

acceptance of that technique.

Studies on crawling pegs also led to. gradual
Indeed, it can be argued that the major

contributio n of research on trade policies during the 1960s has been to provide
concepts and tools which should make exchange crises, trade problems, etc.,
become less of a pressing preoccupati on during the 1970s to LDC policy makers.
The ridiculous extent to which LDC public opinion followed every new local
balance of payments crisis can be made largely a thing of the past, allowing
policy makers to turn, if they have the will, to really basic developmen tal
problems such as mass poverty and low rural productivit y.

We have little to

say on those problems, but perhaps our conscience is saved by showing policy
makers how to avoid letting the basically small problems of trade and payments
policy absorb too much of their attention.

Many of us who look at development

-64that for
wearin g intern ationa l trade. glasse s may have troubl e accep ting
part of the
mos~ large and medium -sized LDCs trade polici es are a small
develo pment proble m.

Furthe rmore , as good fireme n, our effort s during the

g develo pment
1960s have alread y helped to make such part even smalle r, freein
planni ng from the tyrann y of avoida ble payme nts crises .

But only those aspiri ng

roles as world
to use their knowle dge of trade theory as a base to conqu er
men, with
savior s should object to being labell ed simply hones t drafts
15
magic formul as and much empir ical homework to do.

a few

FOOTNOTES

*Friends and colleagues at the Yale Economic Growth Center have
been a great help in the preparation of this paper.

Richard Brecher~

Benjamin I. Cohen, Richard Cooper, Ernestine Jones~· Christina Lanfer,
Vahid Nowshirvani and Gustav Ranis deserve special thanks, but no blame
if their efforts are not well reflected by this survey.

Helpful and

extensive comments from Jagdish Bhagwati, I.M.D. Little and Peter Kenen
are also gratefully acknowledged.
1

This result is somewhat peculiar, as Ronald Findlay argues in

this volume.

Less ambiguously, low elasticities of substitution in

consumption and production will make the short run adjustment problem
more complica~ed.
2

Ricardo's dictum to the effect that income distribution is the

major concern of political economy was largely unheeded, until very re

cently, in postwar mainstream research, theoretical or empirical, on
trade policies and development.

3such as
less tha.~ full f.:!ID.ployment, profit rates not very different
from those in rich countries, but much lower real wages, etc.

4
The growing role of MNCs, and to a lesser extent of state-owned
enterprises, in international trade, will make the borderlines between
trade, location and industrial organization theories increasingly blurred
(Caves, 1971b). The internal rules of large bureaucratic units will neces

sarily influence trade theories as- such units spread their activities
across several countries.

Analytical problems raised by the study of

such administrative rules, in turn, are remarkably similar to those arising
from research on non-market socialist economies.

5

rn a cross country study of industrial concentration ratios, Pryor

(1972) found that average four-firm, four-digit concentration ratios among
large industrial nations are roughly the same, in spite of alleged policy
differences in anti-trust policies.

Concentration in those large nations,

however, was less than a~ong smaller industrialized nations.

Rank orders

of concentration ratios by specific industries were found to be roughly
the same in all nations.

A difficulty in all cross-country studies, but

of particular importance to those involving LDCs, is the difference which
exists in relative price structures from country to country.

For example,

in comparing investment rates in GNP, cross-country studies seldom take
into account differences in the relative prices of capital goods, which
can be large.
6

rn more recent, unpublished work, Chenery (1970a and 1970b) explicit

ly introduces trade policy orientation, as well as capital inflow, as explan
atory variables of the trade and development patterns he isolates.

For

example, he blai~es a policy of import substitution at the expense of export

promotion for the abnormally low levels of exports, not offset by sub
stantial capital inflows, observed for Argentina, Uruguay, Chile and Turkey.
Nevertheless, size of country still emerges as ~he most important difference
explaining various patterns.

In this kind of analysis the level of

agg!'egation and the time span one has in mind very much influences the
judgement regarding how much "policy matters" for both the speed of growth
and its structure.

)

7

some recalcitrant export pessimists make the aesthetically under

standable point that it is difficult to wax enthusiastic about a boom in
exchange earnings which is partly based on items such as wigs, false teeth,
dog toys, plastic flowers, and, in some-countries, blood and cadavers, not
to mention earnings from the sale of tourist services, not all of which
originate in ticket sales at the local anthropological and historical museums.
8
Assurning that LDC non-tradeables are on balance more intensive in
unskilled labor than trade able goods, and that the importance of the sub
sistance sector which makes up a good share of non-tradeables declines with
development, it is to be expected that the ratio of unskilled wage rates
to the exchange rate will be positively correlated with per capita incomes.
Departures from such "normal" relationships could provide clues regarding
degrees of over or undevaluation of currencies.

See also Balassa (1964).

Much remains to be done in making the.distinction between tradeables and
non-tradeables both more empirically useful and theoretically more integrated
with the traditional models used to derive the show-piece theorems of inter
national· trade.

It is not clear, for example, whether the share of non

tradeables in the absorption basket depends only on per-capita income, or
also on country size.

Size, in turn, can be defined in terms of geographical

extension, population or total output.

The.precise degree of "tradeability"

of different commodities is a difficult matter to establish precisely, but
it is probably a mistake to regard all agricultural and manufactured goods
as one hundred percent "tradeable."
9 nuring the late 1950s and early 1960s many economists from industrial

ized countries looked upon explanations of alleged coexistence of output
recession with price inflation in semi-industrialized countries with a mix-

ture of amusement and doubts about both the economists proposing explana
tions and the peculiar economies where such queer happenings were said to
As the Argentinization of first the United Kingdom and then of the

occur.

United States advanced during the 1960s and J970s, one began to hear even
from rigorous macroeconomists in the rich countries rather mystical explana
tions for "stagflation," not so different from those offered in semi
industrialized economies in the 1950s.
10

As shown by Bhagwati and Hansen (1973b), the usual measure of

growth rates based on data at domestic market prices is the correct one
if one is looking for an indicator of the development of actual welfare,
assuming a well-behaved community preference map.

For other purposes,

valuation at international prices is more desirable.

But in general, these

authors argue,. we cannot tell whether a particular measure "exaggerates"
the growth rate.
11
·
The developmental consequences of the bizarre blockade impos_ed on
that island by some members of the world trading community, incidentally,
have not been yet carefully analyzed.

The issues are similar, but hardly

identical, to those involved in the study of the impact of wars and the
1930s -D.epression on LDCs.

The even more complex issues surrounding massive

reorientation in LDC trade links, as a result of donestic and foreign pol
itical decisions, require for their study going way beyond the pure theory
of foreign trade, as Hansen and Nashashibi (1972) emphasize in their study
of Egypt.
12

The fact that many new LDC exports come from firms which, thanks

to protection, still rely on captive domestic markets for most of.their
sales, and which "dump" say ten percent of their output at marginal cost in

world markets, raises the paradoxical possibility that a lowering of
·protection for the output of such firms may decrease their exports, for

a given installed capacity.
13
world financial disorder and inflation during the late 1960s and
early 1970s, however, probably had a positive net effect on LDCs.

When

the 1930s Depression hit, and the world price level fell unexpectedly,
LDC long term foreign debts typically exceeded their short term foreign
exchange assets.

During the Secon<t World War and its aftermath, when the

world price level rose, LDC exchange reserves exceeded their foreign debts.
For a change, during the recent world inflation the long term foreign debt
exceeded exchange reserves in most LDCs, excepting mainly oil countries,
thus partly providing the real debt relief sought by many (e.g., Pearson,
et.al., Chapt~r 8).
14

Although written while discussing rich country policies, the

following warning by Paul Samuelson (1972, p. 450) is relevant here:
"There are correctly formulated systems in which elasticity pessimism is
a correct doctrine rooted in irremovable real elements.
be like such models.

Our world may not

And no doubt many writers of the late 1940s were

paranoid on this subject.

That does not mean we can take as established,

either by valid deductive reasoning or plausible inference from the exper
iences of
correct.
15

the last two decades, that 'elasticity optimism' is assuredly
The jury is still out on this empirical question ••• "

A reviewer of books on the lives of G.D.H. Cole and Lord Robbins

recently suggested that " ••• economics is more a matter of temperament than
the reaching of scientific conclusions from an objective survey of the
evidence" (Paul Johnson, The New York Times, book review section, January

7 5 1973).

Hopefully 5 this will be less true in the future than it has

been in the past for the field of trade policy and development.
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